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ABSTRACT
Research on the emotion disgust, and particularly individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity, has exploded in the past 15 years. However, most of this research has been 
based on outdated theory and poorly designed instruments. Tybur et al., (2009) suggested 
that past theoretical perspectives on disgust should best be updated in light of an 
evolutionary perspective, and measurement of disgust sensitivity should be developed 
based on an evolutionarily informed theory. After suggesting that disgust should be 
categorized along domains related to pathogens, sexuality, and morality, they introduced 
the Three Domain Disgust Scale, a new measure of individual differences in disgust 
sensitivity.
viii
The current set of investigation aimed to advance knowledge of the validity of the 
Three Domain Disgust Scale. A first study demonstrated that the pathogen, sexual, and 
moral factors of the Three Domain Disgust Scale relates to Five Factor Model 
dimensions in a manner consistent with the theory under which the Three Domain 
Disgust Scale was developed. A second study demonstrated that only sensitivity to sexual 
disgust relates to political conservativism, but sensitivity to moral disgust relates to 
disgust reported toward ideologically conflicting ideas and figures within the political 
realm. A third study demonstrated that the Three Domain Disgust Scale measures three 
dimensions in both men and women, though the degree to which individual scale items 
measure these factors varies somewhat between the sexes. Results of these studies are 
discussed, as is the current state of knowledge of the validity of the Three Domain 
Disgust Scale, and potentially fruitful future research directions.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In the family of emotions, disgust has recently graduated from neglected stepsister 
to a belle of the ball. From 1971-1975, the word “disgust” appeared in only 15 
publications listed in PsychInfo. This increased to 25 from 1976-1980, 42 over the next 
five years, and 85, 110, 204, and 388 over the next four five-year spans (see Figure 1). 
This figure sits at 364 over the last three years alone (2006-2008). But despite the 
increased interest in disgust, several outstanding questions remain regarding how to best 
characterize the emotion. After all, disgust is elicited by foods, bodily wastes, some 
animals, bodily deformities, incest, bestiality, pornography, promiscuity, prostitution, 
ponzi schemes, and politicians. The wide variety of disgust elicitors – and the apparent 
lack of similarity between them – begs two critical questions: what function(s) does 
disgust serve, and how should the range of disgust elicitors be categorized? Currently, 
there are multiple answers to these questions. Some suggest that disgust is best perceived 
as a general protector of the self (e.g., Miller, 2004) whereas others suggest multiple 
specialized functions, each with their own elicitors (e.g., Haidt, Rozin, & McCauley, 
1994). 
In this manuscript, I summarize the existing, dominant perspectives on the 
function and categorization of disgust. I then summarize an alternative, more 
evolutionarily informed perspective introduced by Tybur, Lieberman, and Griskevicius 
(2009). I detail the psychometric properties of the Three Domain Disgust Scale, a 
measure of individual differences in disgust sensitivity developed by Tybur et al. (2009). 
I present three studies that evaluate multiple aspects of the validity of this measure. The 
2first study shows how sensitivity to these three domains of disgust relates to Five Factor 
Model personality dimensions; the second study shows how sensitivity to these three 
domains of disgust relate to political ideology; the third examines the factor structure of 
the measure, and how it operates across the sexes. Finally, I discuss how the three 
measures should be interpreted as theoretical constructs in light of the theory under which 
they were developed, the items that define the constructs, and the results of the studies 
included in this manuscript.
Figure 1. Publication rate of disgust articles
Perspectives on Disgust
Starting with Darwin (1872), disgust has been conceptualized as one of the few 
basic, universal human emotions. Over time, researchers have gained a better 
understanding of what elicits disgust, how disgust covaries with other physiological 
responses, and how disgust manifests itself across cultures (Angyal, 1941; Eckman, 
Levenson, & Friesen; Plutchik, 1962; Tompkins, 1963). However, the wide variety of 
3seemingly unrelated concepts that elicit disgust has led to a lack of theoretical cohesion in 
explaining why the emotion operates in so many seemingly unrelated contexts.   
Some perspectives have addressed the varied nature of disgust by proposing that it 
functions in a very general, protective manner. Miller (2004) views disgust as an emotion 
that ultimately functions to protect the self from anything undesirable. From this 
perspective, disgust toward phlegm serves the same purpose as disgust toward politicians: 
to keep polluting ideas and substances on the outside, and to keep purity on the inside. 
Similarly, Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, and Imada (1997) propose, “disgust is bester 
understood as the guardian of the temple of the body” (p. 114), and Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley (2008) suggest that, although disgust originally evolved as a defense against 
pathogens, it has since developed into “a mechanism for avoiding harm to the soul” (p. 
771).
Such perspectives are appealing for their inclusiveness. After all, at first blush, 
vomit, incest, and genocide don’t seem to have much in common except for the fact that 
they all elicit disgust, and they all could be interpreted as threats to the self or soul. But 
this inclusiveness is also a weakness. Although it allows for a simple way to define 
disgust, it does not explain why certain concepts elicit disgust (e.g., hearing about Bill 
Clinton cheating on his wife) whereas others elicit guilt (e.g., cheating on your own 
spouse) and others elicit fear (e.g., being chased by your spouse after she discovered your 
infidelity). After all, guilt could be described as protecting the self by motivating 
corrective action after failure (Lewis, 1993), and fear could be described as protecting the 
self by motivating flight (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Hence, it is unclear why some 
4concepts that threaten the self elicit disgust, whereas others elicit other emotions. A more 
nuanced approach – one that proposes more specific functions – may be more fruitful. 
The Rozin Perspective
Paul Rozin and colleagues have significantly advanced the understanding of 
disgust by offering an account of how and why the emotion may have evolved, and how 
to categorize the emotion across different domains (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; 
Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2000; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986). The most recent and 
comprehensive version of this perspective suggests that different disgust domains can be 
thought of in light of different stages of biological and cultural evolution (Rozin et al., 
2008). From this perspective, disgust originally evolved from distaste (the “zero” stage), 
which functions to protect the body from food-based poisons, and is elicited by bad 
tastes. Selection then operated upon distaste to produce core disgust, the first stage, which 
functions to protect the body from disease, and is elicited by foods, body products, and 
animals. Rozin and Fallon (1987) argue that core disgust is one of four fundamental 
categories of food rejection (the others being distaste, danger, and inappropriateness).
Drawing from work by Becker (1972), Rozin et al. (2008) then suggest that 
animal reminder disgust evolved from core disgust as a defense against a fear of death 
present in all humans. Feeling disgust toward that which reminds us that we are animals –
and thus mortal – “helps to suppress thoughts or experiences that suggest human 
mortality” (p. 761). Echoing this perspective, Goldenberg et al. (2001) argue “[d]isgust 
can be understood as the emotional protest against any reminder of our creatureliness, an 
affective assertion that says ‘I am fundamentally better than that’” (pg. 429). Under this 
5framework, disgust toward prototypical animal reminder elicitors – sex, death (e.g., 
corpses), bad hygiene, and envelop violations (cuts, wounds, and deformity) – does not 
serve the same food based, disease-avoidance function as core disgust. Rather, it 
functions to protect the soul by denying mortality.
The third stage of disgust is described as an interpersonal contamination domain, 
which is posited to exist based on observations that people are averse to touching objects 
used by strangers or individuals possessing a disease, a misfortune (e.g., an amputation), 
or a moral taint (Rozin, Markwith, & McCauley, 1994). Rozin et al. (2008) suggest that 
interpersonal disgust may be an adaptive response for reducing infection risk, but they 
ultimately conclude that it can be best described as functioning to “protect (the) body, 
soul, and social order” (p. 764). 
Finally, Rozin et al. (2008) describe the fourth stage, moral disgust, which 
functions “to protect social order” (p. 764) and is elicited by certain moral offenses. They 
draw upon the CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), under 
which violations of three moral codes elicit three moral emotions: violations of 
community (e.g., fulfilling social obligations) elicit contempt; violations of autonomy 
(e.g., being just and fair) elicit anger; and violations of divinity (e.g., maintaining the 
purity and sanctity of the soul and body) elicit disgust. Examples of violations of divinity 
– and thus moral disgust elicitors – provided by Rozin et al. (1999) include eating rotten 
meat, an incestuous relationship, touching a corpse, biting into an apple with a worm in 
it, and a 70-year-old male who has sex with a 17-year-old female.
Disgust “stages” can be further deconstructed into disgust “domains.” Following 
work by Haidt et al. (1994), Rozin et al. (2008) state, “elicitors of disgust come from nine 
6domains: food, body products, animals, sexual behaviors, contact with death and corpses, 
violations of the exterior envelope of the body (including gore and deformity), poor 
hygiene, interpersonal contamination (contact with unsavory human beings), and certain 
moral offenses” (p. 757). However, little empirical or theoretical evidence suggests that 
disgust elicitors should be categorized along such domains.
Theoretical Problems with the Rozin Perspective
The Rozin perspective has many strengths. It proposes an evolutionary model 
through which disgust could have evolved into its current varied state, and it 
systematically categorizes disgust responses into different stages of evolution and 
different domains of elicitors. However, several empirical and theoretical issues limit the 
plausibility and utility of the perspective.
Foremost theoretically, the model suffers due to a lack of specification of what 
differentiates the purported stages and domains. For example, core disgust is the only 
domain explicitly referred to as functioning to protect against disease, but three of the 
four prototypical elicitors of animal reminder disgust (i.e., dead bodies, bad hygiene, 
wounds) are havens for infectious bacteria. Although interpersonal disgust is suggested to 
protect the body, soul, and social order, it is elicited by contact with other people, who 
are typically the ultimate infection vectors for other humans. And several of the moral 
disgust elicitors said to reflect violations of divinity – most notably contact with a corpse 
and eating rotten food – are clearly pathogen risks. For example, one elicitor – touching a 
corpse – could simultaneously be interpreted as disgusting because of a moral violation 
of divinity, because of interpersonal contamination, because dead bodies remind us that 
we are mortal, and because dead bodies are typically infested with bacteria.
7The core, interpersonal, and moral domains each are posited to either protect 
against real or symbolic contamination threats, so conceptual overlap is not surprising. 
However, the animal reminder domain is suggested to fulfill a function relatively 
independent of disease-avoidance: it protects against the existential terror elicited by 
recognition of our state as a member of the animal kingdom. This perspective is 
problematic for multiple reasons. First, it is unclear why an animal reminder function 
need be invoked at all to account for disgust toward elicitors that share a common 
function with core disgust. Second, it has never been demonstrated that the disgust 
responses to purported animal reminder elicitors are any more similar than disgust 
elicitors grouped into the core disgust domain. Indeed, Tybur et al. (2009) demonstrate 
that self-reported disgust toward sexual concepts – one of the four elicitors of animal 
reminder disgust – shares no relationship with disgust toward other purported reminders 
of animality when disgust toward disease risks is controlled for. Third, it is unclear how a 
disgust response would neutralize reminders of animality or mortality. After all, disgust 
responses toward disease risks (e.g., feces) motivate behavioral avoidance, but they do 
not make one less aware of the presence of the disease risk. Similarly, disgust toward bad 
hygiene seems to motivate behavioral avoidance of the unwashed, but it does not seem to 
make one less aware of their presence. 
Moreover, it is unclear that humans even avoid reminders of animality. Although 
proponents of the animal reminder perspective point to disgust toward concepts like sex, 
bad hygiene, urination, menstruation, and bodily deformity (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 2001; 
Rozin et al., 2008) as evidence that humans avoid reminders of our animal nature, a lack 
of disgust (and indeed, a lack of aversion) toward several concepts that would seem to 
8more straightforwardly act as reminders of animality suggests otherwise. As Royzman 
and Sabini (2001) point out, people seem to react quite positively – and without disgust –
toward several English phrases that draw direct comparisons between humans and 
animals (e.g., “brave as a lion,” “cool cat,” “foxy lady,” “gentle as a dove,” “strong as an 
ox,” “wise as an owl”). Further, it is unclear why, if behaviors such as sex and urination 
are disgusting because animals and non-human animals both engage in them, so many 
other behaviors common to humans and non-human animals do not elicit disgust (e.g., 
running, breathing, sleeping, vocalizing). Finally, Royzman and Sabini question why, if 
reminders of creatureliness indeed motivate disgust responses to sex, gore, death, and bad 
hygiene, then knowledge of the overwhelming overlap in DNA between humans and 
other primates fail to elicit an intense disgust response. Conflicting anecdotal and logical
evidence aside, the processes suggested to have led to the evolution of an animal 
reminder disgust domain are simply not compatible with modern evolutionary theory 
(Buss, 1997; Fessler & Navarrete, 2005; Kirkpatrick & Navarrete, 2006; Navarrete, 
Kurzban, Fessler, & Kirkpatrick, 2004).   
Empirical Problems with the Rozin Perspective
This model has also not been well supported empirically. The nine domains 
suggested by the model were not formed through any vigorous, empirical procedure. 
Indeed, Haidt et al. (1994) generated these domains by examining 221 disgust elicitors 
that had been suggested by 20 individuals. The authors did not report any quantitative 
analyses in generating the domains, nor did they explain a clear, theoretically grounded 
justification for such categorization; rather, items were simply subjectively categorized 
along these nine dimensions by the authors. In constructing the Disgust Scale, an 
9individual differences measure designed to reflect seven of these domains (all but 
interpersonal contamination and moral) and an additional “magical thinking” domain, the 
authors found no empirical evidence to support a seven, eight, or nine domain structure of 
disgust sensitivity. Factor analyses on the 32-item measure did not lead to a conceptually
clear rotated solution, and the internal consistencies of each domain purportedly 
measured in the scale were low (’s ranging from .34 to .60, with a mean of .48). 
Additionally, the measurement properties of the scale were questionable – half of 
the items asked participants to respond true or false to statement, some of which do not 
appear to be strongly related to disgust (e.g., “It would go out of my way to avoid 
walking through a graveyard”; “I think homosexual activities are immoral”), and half of 
the items asked participants to report their disgust toward different acts on a three-point 
scale (not at all disgusting, slightly disgusting, extremely disgusting). When items are 
unit-weighted to compute total scores, these different response formats (0, 1 for 
true/false; 0, 1, 2 for disgust endorsement) inherently give some items greater weight on 
the total item score than others, and they bias item variances to be greater in the three-
point response items. In sum, the lack of quantitative or theoretical justification for 
deriving these domains, the lack of empirical support for the existence of, reliable 
measurement of, and discrimination between these domains, and the questionable 
psychometric properties of the Disgust Scale render interpretations of past results 
obtained with the measure ambiguous. 
Olatunji et al. (2007) reexamined the model proposed by Haidt et al. (1994) and, 
via exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, concluded that the disgust elicitors 
included in the Disgust Scale actually reflected three domains rather than eight. Based on 
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theoretical arguments put forth by Rozin et al. (2008), these domains were described as 
core disgust, animal reminder disgust, and contamination disgust.
Although an empirical improvement on the model suggested by Haidt et al. 
(1994), this three-domain model still suffers from empirical and theoretical limitations. 
The labeling of these domains was based on item loadings from a 25-item version of the 
original 32-item Disgust Scale developed by Haidt et al. (1994), which purportedly 
measured eight domains. However, the validity of the construct labels and definitions is 
suspect. Olatunji et al. (2007) define the core disgust domain as responses to “a sense of 
offensiveness and the threat of contamination,” and the animal reminder domain as 
“reflect(ing) the aversion of stimuli that reserve as reminders of the animal origins of 
humans” (p. 282), and they define the contamination domain as “disgust reactions based 
on the perceived threat of transmission of contagion” (p. 285). The conceptual overlap 
between the core and contamination domains is obvious; indeed, the word 
“contamination” is used to label one domain and define another. At first glance, though, 
it appears that the animal reminder domain may reflect some different aspect of disgust 
from core disgust. In actuality, reactions to items that are said to elicit core disgust are 
correlated .88 with reactions to items that are said to elicit animal reminder disgust.
The redundancy in theoretical definitions of these constructs is complemented by 
overlap in the content of items that are intended to reflect the constructs. For example, 
items concerning bacterial contamination appear on all three domains. Disgust toward 
spoiled milk is said to reflect core disgust, disgust toward handling a dead cat is said to 
reflect animal reminder disgust, and disgust toward accidentally drinking from a glass 
that someone else has been drinking from is said to reflect contamination disgust. 
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Moreover, only one of the eight animal reminder items references animals (a dead cat), 
whereas five of the core disgust items do (monkey meat, a rat, a cockroach, maggots, an 
earthworm). Further, as was the case with the original Disgust Scale, these domains were 
proposed based on the loadings of items that do not appear to straightforwardly reflect 
disgust (e.g., five of the eight items used to define “animal reminder disgust” do not 
directly address disgust). Hence, the empirical support for distinctions between core, 
animal reminder, and contamination disgust is based on a) factors that correlate between 
.65 and .88, b) factors that are measured by potentially disgust irrelevant items, and c) 
factors that have been defined based on questionable interpretations of factor loadings. 
Other Perspectives
Other researchers have suggested that disgust should be categorized along two 
dimensions: disease-avoidance disgusts, and other disgusts. These are referred to in 
several ways, including “theoretical” versus “lay” disgusts (Nabi, 2002), “primary” 
versus “complex” disgusts (Marzillier & Davey, 2004), and “core” versus “socio-moral” 
disgusts (Simpson, Carter, Anthony, & Overton, 2006). The categorization of multiple, 
purportedly distinct disgust domains included in models proposed by Haidt et al. (1994), 
Rozin et al. (2008), and Olatunji et al. (2007) under a single pathogen-avoidance domain 
is consistent with the high theoretical overlap of domains proposed by Rozin et al. and 
the high correlations between purportedly distinct domains found by Haidt et al. and 
Olatunji et al. The distinctiveness between pathogen disgust and complex disgust is also 
reasonable based on cluster analyses by Marzillier and Davey, differential effects of time 
on intensity of the two categories (Simpson et al.), differential relations between the two 
domains and other terms such as “grossed out” and “repulsed” (Nabi), and differential 
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sensitivities to moral and other disgusts (Haidt et al.; Tybur et al, 2009). Brain imaging 
studies also point to distinctions between these two types of disgust (Moll et al., 2005; 
Shaich Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl 2008; Sambataro et al., 2006).
However, multiple empirical results suggest that such a dichotomy 
inappropriately lumps sexual disgust – a potential third domain – into one of these two
categories. Shaich Borg et al. (2008) directly tested the distinctiveness of disgust toward 
incest with disgust toward pathogen risks (e.g., scabs) and non-sexual moral violations 
(e.g., theft) in an fMRI study. Replicating results from Moll et al. (2005) and Sambataro 
et al. (2006), they found that socio-moral disgust and pathogen disgust activate common 
“disgust” regions in the brain, but also activate distinct areas that suggest physiological 
differentiation between the two. But, they also found that disgust toward incest activated 
a third neural region with both common and distinct activation. 
Further, Tybur et al. (2009) performed several factor analyses on self-reported 
disgust toward a wide array of disgust elicitors. Results consistently demonstrated a 
three-domain model consisting of pathogen disgust, sexual disgust, and moral disgust. 
Such results suggest that, while it is appropriate to categorize most core, animal reminder, 
and interpersonal disgust elicitors described by Rozin et al. (2008) into a single pathogen 
domain, and that pathogen disgust is distinct from moral disgust, dichotomization omits 
an important third domain: sexual disgust.
In the next section, I detail how an adaptationist perspective suggests the 
existence of three domains of disgust, each designed in response to a separate adaptive 
problem: pathogen disgust, sexual disgust, and moral disgust. Dividing disgust into these 
three domains is consistent with the empirical results presented by Haidt et al., (1994), 
13
Olatunji et al. (2007), Moll et al., (2005), Sambataro et al. (2006), Shaich Bord et al. 
(2008), Marzillier and Davey, (2004), Simpson et al. (2006), and Tybur et al. (2009).
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Chapter 2
Pathogen Disgust
Individual organisms are constantly threatened by predators of other species; 
gazelles are threatened by cheetahs, cats are threatened by dogs, and rodents are 
threatened by raptors. In each of these instances, prey engage in strategies (e.g., escape, 
concealment) that seem to be motivated by a desire to avoid being killed. Humans can 
sympathize with other species’ plight as prey and their responses. When contemplating 
organisms that threaten our lives, it’s easy to imagine fearsome large carnivores such as 
bears, crocodiles, and sharks, or of small venomous animals such as spiders and snakes. 
Indeed, it’s likely that animals such as these have been recurrent threats to humans’ 
survival for long periods of time, and the fear that people feel toward them is motivated 
by psychological adaptation to neutralize the recurrent adaptive problem of predation 
from recurrent predators (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). When faced with environmental cues 
for the presence of a potential predator, an emotional system activates and motivates us to 
neutralize the threat by fleeing from it or hiding.  
However, for all the fear that people may feel toward creatures with large teeth or 
venom, the most threatening organisms to human fitness are microscopic pathogens. 
Human history is wrought with instances of wide-scale disease epidemics. The Bubonic 
Plague killed over 200 million people in Europe in the 14th century, a strain of Influenza 
killed over 50 million people worldwide in 1918, and HIV and Malaria each currently 
claim millions of lives annually worldwide. Current epidemiologists suggest that SARS, 
Ebola, or Influenza could have similarly devastating results in today’s world (Wilcox & 
Colwell, 2005). Yet outside of these notable pandemics, pathogens have regularly 
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infected humans – and non-humans – throughout history, wrecking substantial fitness
costs, and even acting as a driving force in the evolution of sexual recombination and 
other physiological adaptations serving to increase the variability of a host’s internal 
microenvironment (e.g., Tooby, 1982; Maynard-Smith, 1978). 
The evolutionary impact of pathogens can be obscured by their sometimes subtle 
fitness consequences, their small size (and hence direct undetectability via human 
senses), and, especially, technologies that dampen their impact. Modern first-world 
society offers many innovations – sanitation, antibiotics, access to hospitalization – that 
drastically reduce the mortality rate associated with disease. Moreover, in the event of 
infection, many people can simply “stay home sick” until their illness abates, having easy 
access to food, temperate shelter, and clean water. These conventions obscure the true 
costs of infection, both in our own society, those contemporary societies that lack 
advanced health care, and in the societies in which our ancestors lived. In reality, 
avoiding infection was one of the most pressing adaptive problems that our ancestors 
faced (and remains so today). Before the advent of modern health care, humans would 
have had few, if any, of these conveniences (although foraging societies do provide some 
health care to the ill, see Sugiyama, 2004), and even something as mild as a head cold 
could have had important energetic and reproductive costs. Besides generally feeling ill 
and not being able to optimally hunt or gather resources, an individual with even minor 
infection would be forced to apply finite energetic resources to combating infection rather 
than maintaining other biological systems.
Although even minor infections connote energetic costs, more severe infections 
imply even graver consequences. Consider bejel, a disease endemic to the Middle East 
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and Africa, as an example. Untreated, bejel severely deteriorates bone, skin, and tissue 
around the mouth, nose and eyes, and it can result in severe energetic, reproductive, and 
social costs. Physical deformities caused by the infection can make simple acts like 
walking, seeing, and eating quite difficult. Moreover, physical deformity associated with 
the illness presumably greatly impairs one’s ability to acquire mates and social allies. 
Ultimately, the infection could have the same consequences on reproductive output as 
death. And, of course, death is the ultimate consequence of many infections; indeed, a 
survey of 3,328 deaths across 13 contemporary hunter-gatherer and horticultural societies 
found that illness was the cause of death in approximately 70% of cases (Gurven & 
Kaplan, 2007).  
Pathogens have posed such strong fitness consequences that we’ve evolved an 
extremely complex and expensive immune system to neutralize infectious 
microorganisms. Yet for all the attention paid to the function of the physiological 
immune system, little thought is given to its psychological compliment – a “behavioral 
immune system” (Schaller, 2006). Given reliable, recurrent cues for pathogen presence, it 
is inconceivable that selection would have favored the evolution of such a metabolically 
expensive immune system without also producing psychological adjuncts to motivate 
behavioral avoidance of infection.  
An Emotional Adaptation for Avoiding Pathogens
Humans are not unique in avoiding pathogens – several other species (e.g., mice, 
bullfrog tadpoles, chimpanzees – see Schaller & Duncan, 2007) demonstrate similar 
behavioral avoidance of infection risks. In humans, at least, this behavioral avoidance is 
motivated by an emotional response, which evolved in response to selection pressures to 
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avoid infection. Although fear functions well in motivating avoidance of large predators 
or aggressive conspecifics, it would not motivate an efficient response to microorganisms 
as small as one ten-millionth of our size. In the case of small pathogens that don’t give 
chase at high speeds, rapid flight would not have prevented infection any more than 
minor proximal avoidance. The behaviors motivated by a fear response – perspiration, 
increased heart rate, general increased energy use – would have connoted higher 
energetic costs than a more efficient response to pathogen presence. Selection would thus 
have favored a more efficient behavioral strategy motivated by a separate emotional 
response: pathogen disgust. Rather than motivating rapid flight from a threatening large 
organism, pathogen disgust motivates comparatively minor proximal avoidance of 
objects deemed to be disease threats.  
Although pathogens themselves are indeed often invisible to the naked eye, we do 
have the ability to detect their presence with some accuracy. Given their microscopic 
nature, the best evolution could do is to take advantage of olfactory, visual, tactile, and 
auditory cues that correlated with pathogen presence to shape an “intuitive microbiology” 
(Pinker, 1998). Selection favored an emotional response – pathogen disgust – that 
motivated avoidance of objects possessing the cues associated with anything that reliably 
housed pathogens. Common pathogen-housing objects and substances include feces, 
vomit, spoiled food, blood, saliva, semen, ticks, fleas, lice, snails, slugs, flies, and worms 
(Curtis & Biran, 2001). And it should not be surprising that each of these is regularly 
described as “disgusting.” However, humans do not have omniscient knowledge of the 
true pathogen threats posed by such objects. Rather, we must rely on visual, olfactory, 
tactile, and auditory cues to determine if something in the environment likely belongs in 
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one of these categories. Thus, instead of evolving to find feces, blood, or semen 
disgusting per se, we’ve evolved to judge things that smell like feces, look like blood, or 
feel like goop to be disgusting. Liquids that are yellow, brown, and red – colors of 
potentially infectious bodily secretions such as pus, blood, and semen – are judged to be 
more disgusting than those that are blue; faces that are altered to appear wet and splotchy 
– states that are associated with fever – are rated as more disgusting than “normal” faces; 
and skin legions that are open and oozing – states that connote wound infection – are 
rated as more disgusting than dry, unbroken legions characteristic of burns (Curtis et al., 
2004).
The evolution of a system designed to detect pathogen presence with some degree 
of accuracy was a tremendous advantage for individuals in their continuous conflict with 
infectious microorganisms. By acquiring infections at a lower frequency, the metabolic 
resources that would otherwise be applied to fighting parasites could instead be used for 
tasks related to foraging, attracting mates, investing in kin and other social allies, and 
maintaining other somatic systems. Moreover, avoiding infectious agents would 
drastically reduce the risk of disease-related morbidity and mortality.  
How to Get an Infection
In conjunction with the immune system and pathogen disgust, humans combat 
pathogens with the skin, which acts as a layer of microbe repelling armor. If our senses 
fail to detect pathogens – or if we fail to successfully avoid them – infection is not 
inevitable.  Most pathogens must first bypass the skin and enter the body before they 
wreck havoc. They can do this either through a puncture wound that opens up a path 
directly into the body, or via one of the body’s naturally occurring “gateways” (the eyes, 
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ears, nostrils, mouth, urethra, vagina, and anus) to the outside world. If the human body is 
pictured as a castle fortified in a manner that keeps pathogens at bay, bodily orifices are 
the vulnerable entrances through which pathogens can bypass exterior security. 
Requirements to collect nutritional and sensory information from the outside world – and 
to eject bodily wastes – necessitate that we constantly risk being compromised by 
pathogens through these routes. Not coincidently, we are extremely averse to allowing 
most objects to come into contact with any bodily orifice (Fessler & Haley, 2006; Rozin, 
Nemeroff, Horowitz, Gordon, & Voet 1995), and the degree of aversion people feel 
toward being “penetrated” is related to the degree to which they feel vulnerable to 
infection (Tybur, 2005).
Given our requirement for nourishment and our vulnerability to disease, it’s not 
surprising that people view eating with some ambivalence, as any meal can be a 
pathogenic Trojan Horse. Any meat (or other animal product) potentially houses harmful 
amounts of bacteria (e.g., Salmonella, E. Coli) or macro-parasites (e.g., tapeworms). 
Although vegetable matter also has the potential to house pathogenic bacteria and fungus, 
meats contain pathogens at a much higher intensity and rate. Any time a food source 
comes into contact with a “polluted” (infected) object, it has the potential to acquire 
infectious pathogens, thus making it an infection risk (e.g., a formerly clean piece of meat 
that is covered in flies may now house pathogens that the fly carried on it from its last 
meal of feces or rotting meat). Regardless of the differential infection risks of eating (i.e., 
it’s more likely for a human to acquire an infection when eating cow than when eating 
grass), any meal has the potential to cause great harm, and net nutritional benefits must 
be weighed against perceived infection risk.    
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Many disgusting objects are perceived as such because they possess cues (e.g., the 
smell associated with feces) that have reliably been associated with pathogens over long 
periods of evolutionary time. A system designed to find only the prospect of eating 
objects that exhibit these cues would be devastatingly inefficient, and likely never would 
have evolved. For example, if we only found it disgusting to eat feces, but we didn’t 
mind handling the substance, the bacteria housed inside would make its way from our 
hands into our eyes, our genitals, puncture wounds or scrapes we might acquire, and, 
perhaps most importantly, onto our “clean” food and into our mouths. Rozin and Fallon’s 
(1987) core disgust is thus not best characterized as related to food specifically, but as 
related to pathogens, which often enter the body via the mouth.    
Several evolutionarily oriented scholars have similarly suggested that disgust 
evolved to motivate pathogen avoidance (e.g., Curtis et al, 2004; Curtis & Biran, 2001; 
Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Pinker, 1997; Haidt, et al., 1997), and Curtis and Biran (2001) 
illustrate the myriad of legitimate disease threats posed by “disgusting” smells and sights.  
However, these arguments can intuitively appear shortsighted and insufficient in light of 
the ease with which pathogenic disgust elicitors can lose their infectiousness without 
losing their capacity to disgust. Rozin et al. (1986) illustrated the inconsistency between 
infection risk and disgust by “sterilizing” dead cockroaches, dog feces, and vomit (the 
cockroach was literally sterilized while the dog feces was in reality fudge and the vomit 
was a rubber imitation of vomit) and observing that people show strong aversion to 
contact with the items possessing cues for infection even though they rationally know 
that no infection risk is present.  It’s quite easy to generate examples of disgusting stimuli 
that don’t pose an infection risk; indeed, one could think of somehow sterilizing virtually 
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anything that’s both disgusting and infectious, and results would probably be identical to 
Rozin et al.’s. This phenomenon has led several researchers to conclude that disgust 
functions in a generally abstract, self-protection manner rather than a specific, disease-
avoidance manner. However, an evolutionarily informed perspective easily accounts for 
disgust toward rationally noninfectious objects.
Adaptive Bias in Pathogen Disgust
The first explanation is related to an application of signal detection theory (Green 
& Swets, 1966). “The smoke detector principle” (Nesse, 2005; Nesse, 2001) generally 
suggests that asymmetries associated with the costs of failing to identify potential threats 
and “false alarming” to nonexistent threats will promote bias toward the less costly error 
(e.g., having a fever when parasites pose a mild threat rather than not having a fever 
when parasites pose a grave threat). Similarly, Error Management Theory (Haselton & 
Nettle, 2006; Haselton & Buss, 2000) argues that, because humans have rarely had 
perfect knowledge of the world over our evolutionary history, we have evolved adaptive 
biases that promote committing the less costly of two cognitive errors under ambiguous
conditions.     
Adaptive bias can account for much of the disgust expressed toward entities that 
pose objectively low (or, in some cases, nonexistent) infection threats. Vomit is a good 
example. People encounter vomit regularly (and they probably have throughout our 
evolutionary history), and they tend to be quite disgusted by it. This disgust motivates 
behavioral avoidance that in turn decreases the potential for the vomit to come into 
contact with the body’s interior. But even though people tend to avoid vomit like the 
plague, the probability of actually contracting the plague (or another infectious disease) 
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from contacting the vomit is unknown. This probability is influenced by several factors, 
including the vomiter’s current health status (e.g., did he vomit from motion sickness or 
did he vomit because he had a bacterial infection), the observer’s current immune 
strength, and the probability that the microbes in the vomit could enter the observer’s 
body, etc. Because it’s impossible to calculate the exact infection risk posed by the vomit, 
selection has favored adaptive bias toward being hypersensitive and making false alarms 
(i.e., acting as if the vomit poses a serious infection risk) rather missing a potential 
infection risk.  Both errors have costs, but the costs associated with a false alarm (i.e., 
feeling an emotion that motivates avoidance of the area in which the vomit rests when the 
vomit doesn’t pose a serious infection risk) are much lower than the cost associated with 
a miss (i.e., not avoiding an area that poses an infection risk and contracting a serious 
illness). Indeed, people seem prone to always treating vomit as an infection risk, and they 
pay the usually minor cost of enthusiastically avoiding a small area.
Most disgust-evoking stimuli follow this principle. Among other things, feces can 
transmit hepatitis A and cholera, blood can transmit lassa fever and syphilis, skin lesions 
can transmit chicken pox and staph infections, and nasal secretions can transmit rubella 
and tuberculosis (Curtis & Biran, 2001). Each of these disgust elicitors can transmit these 
infections (and many others), but the probability of any one encounter with these 
substances causing substantial fitness impairment is uncertain. Still, despite a potentially 
low probability of contracting a harmful infection from one of these substances, the 
correct strategy in a world of uncertainty is to pay the relatively low costs of avoidance 
rather than paying the severe (albeit perhaps infrequent) costs of potentially fatal 
infection.
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The power of this adaptive bias is relevant not only to our reactions to everyday 
disgust elicitors that pose little realistic infection risk, but to irrational disgust responses 
to stimuli that pose no infection risk.  For example, people appear to avoid others who 
possess physical handicaps (e.g., missing limbs, confinement to wheelchairs) in a manner 
that shows evidence for design to avoid pathogens (Park, et al., 2003).  Although these 
individuals may be physically handicapped because of something environmentally 
mediated (e.g., a car accident), people treat them as if they carry an infectious disease.  
The costs of subtly stigmatizing and avoiding close contact with people possessing bodily 
abnormalities – most of which probably were caused by infectious disease (e.g., bejel,  
elephantitis caused by filariasis) over our evolutionary history – was again quite low 
compared to the costs of not avoiding them and potentially catching a debilitating 
disease.
Mismatches
Modern life presents several contingencies that “mismatch” with the environment 
in which we evolved. Sexual behavior in light of contraception is a prototypical example.  
Although sexual desire and sexual pleasure evolved because they motivated behavior that 
resulted in conception, they persist today even in people who intentionally avoid 
pregnancy through the use of contraceptives. Because contraception was not a part of the 
environment in which we evolved (i.e., it “mismatches” with the current environment), 
we respond to sexual stimulation as if it was the ultimate manner for reproduction 
regardless of our rational knowledge that it will not result in conception if we use 
contraceptives. Other mismatches include our preferences for fatty, salty, and sweetened 
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foods, and our emotional responses to rationally benign images shown on two-
dimensional surfaces (Maner et al., 2004; Gross & Levenson, 1995).
Artificially sterile objects also “mismatch” with the environment in which we 
evolved. Simply telling someone that a cockroach – or any object that possesses cues for 
infection risk – has been sterilized likely does not remove the appraisal of infection risk. 
This disgust is irrational in the same way that being frightened by a scary book or aroused 
by an erotic film is irrational, but it is nevertheless motivated by psychological adaptation 
for avoiding infection.
Several aspects of our modern environment render the formerly infectious 
relatively safe. One could avoid acquiring a sexually transmitted disease by using a 
condom during sexual intercourse. One could puncture the skin with a sterilized needle 
and immediately apply an antimicrobial substance and a bandage to the wound. One 
could even safely handle vomit or feces by wearing rubber gloves.  Each of these acts 
involves modern technologies that allow for avoidance of infection under circumstances 
that would have otherwise been extremely dangerous over most of our evolutionary 
history. Because selection has not had sufficient time to attenuate the pathogen-avoidance 
psychology involved in several acts rendered safe by modern technologies, we often react 
to non-infectious stimuli with an “irrational” disease-avoidance response. 
Confusion Regarding Pathogen Disgust
Because of issues related to evolutionary mismatch, adaptive bias, and perhaps an 
overemphasis on food, Rozin et al. (2000) suggest the presence of multiple disgust 
domains that I believe should be described as pathogen disgust. For example, they 
suggest a death disgust domain motivated by “a universal fear of death”. This 
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interpretation of disgust toward decay and rot is highly questionable, since being 
disgusted by a dead animal does little to motivate behavior that would solve the adaptive 
problem of dying, or the purported problem of being afraid of death. Moreover, a 
pathogen disgust interpretation is much more parsimonious than a fear-of-death 
explanation. When an organism dies, its body is immediately overcome with potentially 
infectious bacteria, and contact with the dead can easily transmit those bacteria from the 
corpse into your body.
This pathogen disgust framework sheds light onto why several concepts elicit 
disgust.  For example, disgust toward certain human bodily abnormalities, potentially 
including amputated limbs, obesity, cleft palates, and large pigmented birthmarks, may 
exist because of adaptive bias in judgment; the costs associated with being overly 
sensitive to bodily abnormalities and avoiding them even when they don’t connote 
infection risk were greater than the costs associated with being insensitive to bodily 
abnormalities and risking infection risk (examples of bodily abnormalities that do 
connote potential infection risk include elephantitis caused by Filiarial worms, 
disfigurement caused by Leprosy, and lesions associated with Bejel). Several studies 
have confirmed this hypothesis, finding that individuals with seemingly noninfectious 
bodily abnormalities are associated with disease (Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2007; Park 
et al., 2003; Duncan & Schaller, 2005).  
Pathogen disgust doesn’t seem quite as unruly in light of the strong fitness costs 
our ancestors paid in the event of infection. Although a minor respiratory infection or 
stomach ailment seem relatively innocuous now, they nevertheless are energetically 
costly to combat, and they were a significant handicap in the absence of plentiful food, 
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water, and shelter. And although more serious infections are often rendered mere 
annoyances by antibiotics and vaccines, they extracted massive fitness costs from our 
ancestors, and they would in us now in the absence of modern medicine.  Biases in 
judgment are thus skewed toward being hyper-sensitive to potential infection risk, and 
the novelties of sterilization and artificial barriers against infection do little to deflate the 
disgust we feel toward stimuli that are estimated to carry even a minor infection risk.
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Chapter 3
Sexual Disgust
Multiple researchers (e.g., Angyal, 1941; Miller, 1997; Rozin et al., 2000; 
Thompkins, 1963) have recognized a connection between sexuality and disgust. The 
Rozin perspective suggests that the connection falls under the animal reminder disgust 
domain – humans are disgusted by sexuality to reject a potential reminder that we are 
animals and will eventually die. As previously noted, the plausibility of the animal 
reminder perspective is highly suspect.  Moreover, this perspective ignores the strong 
adaptive consequences of sexual choices and behaviors, and the potential utility of an 
emotion such as disgust in the realm of sexual decision-making.
The Importance of Mating
Across species, animals’ mating decisions are profoundly important. Certain 
sexual partners can produce healthy offspring who in turn produce healthy offspring; 
others can produce no offspring or unhealthy offspring who may not reproduce 
themselves. Selection has thus favored the evolution of psychologies that can judge a 
potential mate’s quality, and emotions that motivate pursuit when appropriate. 
Consequently, a bevy of research has indicated that traits associated with genetic quality 
(e.g., health and fertility) are perceived as sexually attractive (for a review, see Grammer, 
Fink, Moller, & Thornhill, 2003).  
Genetic quality can be categorized as intrinsic quality and compatibility (Zeh & 
Zeh, 1996; Jenions & Petrie, 2000). Intrinsically good genes additively contribute to 
offspring quality.  For example, low mutation load, especially at key loci involved in the 
expression of traits found to be sexually attraction (Rowe & Houle, 1996) makes genes 
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intrinsically “good.” Compatible genes, on the other hand, interact with a sexual partner’s 
genes; they can be detrimental or beneficial in offspring depending on how they match 
with a sexual partner’s. For example, it has been suggested that a certain level of 
dissimilarity between parents on immune-relevant Major Histocompatibility Complex 
(MHC) alleles lead to optimal immune function in offspring (Penn & Potts, 1999), and 
humans prefer the scent of MHC dissimilarity (Thornhill, Gangestad, Miller, Scheyd, 
McCollough, & Franklin, 2003; Wedekind & Furi, 1997) and tend to marry others who 
are MHC dissimilar (Ober, Weitkamp, Cox, Dytch, Kostyu, & Elias, 1997). Possessing a 
certain combination of MHC alleles does not necessarily intrinsically lead to healthy or 
unhealthy offspring. Rather, the quality of the alleles depends on whom one is sharing 
them with.  
Although the reproductive benefits of mating can be high – as are the costs 
associated with missing a mating opportunity (Haselton & Buss, 2000) – mating involves 
several non-trivial costs, including:
1) Opportunity Costs: Every investment of time and energy into pursuing or 
copulating with a mate entails a sacrifice of resource investment in something else 
(e.g., investing in non-romantic relationships with kin or social allies, gathering 
resources).  More specifically, investment in pursuing one mate sacrifices the 
opportunity to pursue another, who may be a better option. This cost is especially 
high for women. When choosing to copulate, a woman essentially risks 
sacrificing the opportunity to conceive with any other man for at least nine 
months. If the man she conceives with is particularly low quality (e.g., has a high 
mutation load; has very incompatible genes), she would not only produce a 
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relatively poor quality offspring; she also would lose the opportunity to produce a 
high quality offspring with another man during that time.
2) Energetic and Birthing Costs: Pregnancy is metabolically expensive for women, 
and, although necessary for reproduction, can be deadly under certain conditions.  
Further, a woman risks death with each birth, with per-birth mortality rates 
varying between approximately 2% in modern developing nations and 0.001% in 
modern developed nations (Van Lerberghe & De Brouwere, 2001). Death can be 
viewed as the ultimate opportunity cost in this sense, as each conception has the 
potential to be a woman’s last because of death during birth.
3) Disease: Sexual behaviors, including hugging, kissing, oral sex, anal sex, and 
intercourse are among the most disease-risky activities that humans engage in. A 
simple hug can transmit any pathogens resting on the flesh from one to another.  
A closed-mouth kiss adds the potential of transmitting any pathogens transmitted 
through respiratory fluids, and an open mouthed kiss allows transmission of 
pathogens living in saliva. Oral sex further increases the risk of contracting 
disease carried in semen or vaginal fluids. Sexual intercourse causes small tears in 
the vagina and on the penis, and these tears allow routes through which pathogens 
can be transmitted.  
The costs and benefits of mating vary as a function of several variables, and 
people simultaneously seek out certain individuals as mates while avoiding others. Given 
the ubiquity of these mating costs across species, it shouldn’t be surprising that sexual 
avoidance is not unique to humans. Indeed, even chimpanzee females, who are 
characterized as highly promiscuous and largely under the sexual control of males, 
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strategically (and somewhat successfully) avoid copulating with males who are deemed 
unacceptable mates (Stumpf & Boesch, 2005). For humans, at least, approach and 
avoidance of potential sexual partners is motivated by emotional responses. Given that 
disgust has been described as a reaction to unwanted sexual contact (Tomkins, 1963) and 
as the antithesis of sexual arousal (Koukounas & McCabe, 1997; Vonderheide & Mosher, 
1988), it seems reasonable to describe the motivation to avoid sexual contact disgust, and 
the motivation to seek out sexual contact lust.  
The function and necessity of a lust response is straightforward: when an 
individual detects someone who demonstrates cues associated with high mate quality, 
they may feel an intense desire to engage in various behaviors that reliably lead to 
conception. But the simple absence of a lust response is no more adequate for avoiding 
mating with inappropriate sexual partners than the absence of gustatory desire is adequate 
for avoiding the pathogens housed within feces. Just as apathy toward feces may not 
sufficiently prevent one from handling or accidentally ingesting them, simply lacking an 
intense desire to mate with a low-quality partner (i.e., being apathetic) may not 
effectively prevent copulation. Because the costs to mating – especially with a low-
quality partner – are so great, an emotion that motivates people to avoid and reject costly 
mating opportunities that offer few benefits is necessary. This emotion is what I call 
sexual disgust.
Hypothetically, selection co-opted pathogen disgust for the function of avoiding 
costly mating activities. Both avoiding pathogens and avoiding costly mating require a 
specific emotional response consistent with disgust. Avoidance motivated by fear, which 
may involve flight or concealment, would be an inefficient and potentially ineffective 
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way of avoiding sub-optimal sexual behaviors. Because costly sexual partners may 
actually be excellent social partners in other contexts (e.g., a trustworthy and 
reciprocating, but sexually unattractive, friend), a motivation to flee that person when 
sexual behavior is considered may damage other benefits gleaned from the relationship. 
However, being disgusted by the prospect of a specifically sexual relationship with that 
person may motivate avoidance of pursuing a sexual relationship, or to specifically reject 
potential sexual advances.
Differentiating Sexual and Pathogen Disgust
From a certain perspective, sexual disgust is nothing more than pathogen disgust 
(this idea was alluded to by Angyal, 1941). Because sexual intercourse involves close 
interpersonal contact and exchange of bodily fluids, it is inherently a strong disease risk 
(indeed, many diseases transmitted between humans can be thought of as transmissible 
through intimate intereactions like sex). Through some unknown mechanism, pathogen 
disgust is suppressed when considering sexual behavior with another individual who is 
deemed high quality.  
Although the two disgusts are related, they are distinguishable for two primary 
reasons. First, the two motivate different behavioral responses. Pathogen disgust 
motivates proximal distance from an infected individual (or disease-risky act), whereas 
sexual disgust specifically motivates avoidance of sexual relationships even if disease-
risky acts (e.g., intercourse) have yet to be initiated; this avoidance of sexual behavior 
can be unrelated to proximity. Second, they are elicited by vastly different cues. Whereas 
pathogen disgust is elicited by cues that have indicated pathogen presence over 
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evolutionary history, sexual disgust is elicited by cues for kinship or cues for poor quality 
or poor compatibility. 
Cues for poor intrinsic quality
Conceivably, many of the same cues used to detect high quality are also used to 
detect low quality.  For example, if high facial symmetry indicates high quality via 
immunocompetence (as found by Thornhill & Gangestad, 2006), low facial symmetry 
indicates low quality via susceptibility to infection. Notably, many traits (e.g., facial 
masculinity and symmetry) used to assess attractiveness are more strongly associated 
with underlying quality on the negative end of distribution of attractiveness ratings 
(Zebrowitz & Rhodes, 2004). Thus, when assessing a potential mate’s quality, it’s 
sometimes only the notably unattractive individuals who reliably exhibit cues of low 
quality, and who should especially be avoided as sexual partners. These cues – many of 
which are associated with disorders such as Canavan disease, Down syndrome, Late 
Onset Tay-Sachs disease, and XYY syndrome – include impaired cognitive function, 
unusual facial structure, unusually poor muscle tone, poor motor control, obesity or 
gauntness, and abnormally long or short limbs. Additionally, displays of personality, 
creativity, and moral virtues may signal quality, or lack thereof (Haselton & Miller, 2005; 
Miller, 2000, 2007).   
Adaptive bias in judgment and mismatches operates in sexual disgust as in 
pathogen disgust. Environmental insults (e.g., a blow to the face, being hit by a car, 
having severe burns) may lead to facial deformity or neurological impairment. The cues 
for poor intrinsic quality may exist, but the victim’s genes may be just fine. Because such 
deviations from a “normal” appearance have reliably connoted inheritable mutation over 
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our evolutionary history, and because the costs of “missing” cues for poor intrinsic 
quality are much lower than the costs of failing to detect them, such environmental 
insults are unconsciously perceived as connoting some genetic affliction. 
Olfactory cues also indicate intrinsic gene quality, and they may play a role in 
motivating sexual disgust. Fluctuating asymmetry (FA, i.e., the degree to which a 
person’s body departs from being bilaterally symmetric) has been show to correlate with 
several variables related to survival and reproduction (reviews in Gangestad & Thornhill, 
1999; Moller & Swaddle, 1997). Numerous studies (e.g., Gangestad & Thornhill, 1998; 
Rikowski & Grammer, 1999; Thornhill et al., 2003) have indicated that women in the 
fertile phase of their menstrual cycles – the time in which they could conceive if they 
engaged in intercourse – are sensitive to the scent of symmetry, even when they do not 
have any other information about the person’s identity. 
Cues for Poor Compatibility
Close genetic relatedness is an important form of poor genetic compatibility.  
Humans possess multiple recessive, potentially lethal deleterious alleles (Bittles & Neel, 
1994).  These genes are usually not problematic, because they lie unexpressed in their 
heterozygous form.  And because of their infrequency, it’s extremely unlikely that two 
parents would both have a specific recessive allele and both pass that gene on to an 
offspring.  However, when sexual partners are close genetic relatives, the probability that 
they share a specific lethal recessive gene increases considerably.  Thus an individual of 
the opposite sex who demonstrates high intrinsic quality (e.g., low FA, optimal waist-to-
hip ratio, attractive skin) could be an extremely poor reproductive partner if they share 
lethal recessive alleles. 
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Given these costs, it’s not surprising that incest is universally avoided and even 
tabooed across human cultures (Brown, 1991). But as is the case with intrinsic quality, 
it’s impossible to have exact knowledge of one’s degree of relatedness to a potential 
sexual partner. Humans must thus rely on cues for kinship.
Drawing on adaptationist logic and work by Wolf (1995) and Shepher (1971), 
Lieberman, Tooby, and Cosmides (2003) suggested that a system designed to estimate 
kinship between siblings would optimally function by measuring co-residence duration 
during childhood. They predicted that individuals who cohabitated with an opposite-sex 
sibling during childhood would have received cues indicating close relatedness to a 
member of the opposite sex, and thus would develop a strong aversion to sibling-incest. 
More specifically, they predicted that the length of co-residence with an opposite sex 
sibling would predict incest-aversion. Consistent with this hypothesis, they found that an 
individual’s length of co-residence with a sibling predicted the degree to which sibling 
incest was judged to be morally wrong. Moreover, they found that, once length of co-
residence was accounted for, there was no relationship between incest-aversion and 
objective degree of relatedness between an individual and an opposite-sex sibling (i.e., 
controlling for co-residence duration, those who had opposite-sex siblings showed no 
greater incest aversion than those who had half-siblings or step-siblings). Finally, they 
also demonstrated that length of co-residence with an opposite-sex sibling predicted 
incest aversion strongly even when those siblings were not related (i.e., they were step-
siblings or adopted). 
This last finding – that co-residence duration is related to incest avoidance even 
when there is no objective risk of sibling incest – demonstrates that cues for a mate’s 
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quality and compatibility are imperfect, just as cues for infectious disease and intrinsic 
quality are. As Wolf (1995) and Shepher (1971) both demonstrated, unrelated individuals 
can respond toward each other as if they are extremely genetically incompatible simply 
because they were raised together, even if they are socially encouraged to mate.  
Disgust Toward Specific Sexual Acts
As previously noted, intimate sexual contact is extremely disease-risky, and 
pathogen disgust must be “suppressed” in order for the prospect of intimately sharing 
bodily fluids with another individual to be appealing rather than aversive. Pathogen 
disgust is not suppressed in a general manner when one identifies a desirable sexual 
partner, though. Rather, disgust toward very specific activities (e.g., close physical 
contact, genital contact with seminal and vaginal fluids) that are necessary for 
reproduction is suppressed. Disgust toward other pathogen risks that are not associated 
with reproduction (e.g., oral contact with nasal fluids) is not suppressed.
The degree to which depression in pathogen disgust is generalized to non-
intercourse activities appears to vary substantially both within (Tybur et al., 2009) and 
between societies (Ford & Beach, 1951). At this point, the mechanism through which this 
variation occurs is unclear. Conceivably, local pathogen presence may influence 
generalization of sexuality beyond intercourse. In pathogen-rich ecologies, the costs of 
overgeneralization are likely higher than those in lower prevalence locales. Schaller and 
Murray (2008) found support for this hypothesis: cross-cultural variation in 
sociosexuality – which is conceivably negatively correlated with sexual disgust – is 
associated with parasite prevalence; those cultures with fewer parasites are more open to 
casual sexual activities. Additionally, something as simple as hygiene availability may 
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influence the generalization of pathogen disgust suppression, both within and between 
societies. Groups that bathe with high frequency may remove residual body odors that 
would otherwise trigger pathogen disgust, thus allowing evolutionarily novel sexual 
activities (e.g., oral sex). Of course, greater access to hygiene is related to pathogen 
prevalence, but personal hygiene may reduce cues for pathogen prevalence that do not 
indicate a true infection risk.
In exploring individual differences in sensitivity to disgust (i.e., the degree to 
which people report feeling disgust toward various concepts), Tybur et al. (2009) found 
that items concerning sexual acts (e.g., performing oral sex; having anal sex) and partner 
choice (e.g., bringing someone you just met back to your room to have sex; finding out 
someone you don’t like has sexual fantasies about you) consistently loaded on the same 
“sexual disgust” factor across multiple studies. This may suggest that disgust toward low-
quality partners and disgust toward specific sexual acts may be subsumed within a 
common sexual disgust domain.  
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Chapter 4
Moral Disgust
When asked to generate a general list of disgusting concepts, people often report 
moral violations along with concepts that would be categorized as Pathogen Disgust or 
Sexual Disgust (Haidt et al., 1994; Nabi, 2002). These moral violations broadly include 
concepts related to norm violating anti-social activities such as lying, cheating, and 
stealing. It would seem that the word “disgust” is often colloquially used to refer to 
something different from what we have described as pathogen disgust and sexual disgust. 
In this vein, Nabi (2002) argued that it’s important to examine the “theoretical versus the 
lay meaning of disgust,” (pp.1). This statement is half-correct. It is indeed important to 
recognize the domain specificity of disgust. However, pitting the “lay” meaning of 
disgust versus the “theoretical” meaning of disgust incorrectly implies that one have 
theoretical primacy over the other – that one is an abstraction of language, and the other 
should be of interest to social scientists. 
Is Moral Disgust Really Disgust?
Multiple pieces of evidence suggest that moral disgust is indeed a phenomenon 
worth studying, and is not merely a colloquial abstraction of language. In a study of the 
relationship between disgust and morality across cultures, Haidt et al. (1997) found that 
all languages surveyed use the same word to describe moral violations and infectious 
entities like feces and cockroaches, suggesting that the existence of moral “disgust” is not 
simply a quirk of the English language, but is a reliable cross-cultural phenomenon. Jones 
and Fitness (2008) found that Australian psychology students who read vignettes about 
crimes involving drug trafficking, conning, fraud, or theft were more likely to form words 
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associated with pathogen disgust in a word-stem completion task relative to controls. 
Wheatley and Haidt (2005) demonstrated that participants hypnotized to feel disgust 
toward arbitrary words had more severe moral judgments of morally questionable 
individuals, Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008) found that disgusting odors and 
videos increased the severity of moral judgments relative to controls, and Schnall, 
Benton, and Harvey (2008) found that individuals primed with “cleanliness” (either 
through washing their hands or being exposed to semantic primes) judged moral offenses 
less severely than controls. Chapman, Kim, Susskind, and Anderson (2009) found that 
the same facial muscles are engaged when participants were exposed to photos of 
contaminants relative to unfair treatment in an economics game. Even children as young 
as six years old describe immoral behaviors with the word disgust, and photographs of 
disgust facial expressions to verbal descriptions of immoral activities (Danovitch & 
Bloom, 2009). Finally, multiple fMRI studies have shown overlap in the neural regions 
activated during moral judgment versus pathogen disgust (Moll et al., 2005; Schaich 
Borg et al., 2008). 
Despite these findings, though, moral disgust is often intuitively viewed as an 
abstraction, or an illegitimate emotion. Perhaps pathogen disgust is viewed as “real” and 
moral disgust is viewed as a metaphor or abstraction because pathogen cues typically 
elicit only disgust, whereas moral violations can elicit a suite of emotions (e.g., anger, 
guilt, contempt, disgust, sadness). Regardless of the reason for its neglect, moral disgust 
appears to be a legitimate emotion related to the previously discussed disgust domains.
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Why Be Disgusted by Moral Transgressions?
Humans evolved in close-knit groups in which interdependence and social 
exchange were the norm. Frequent social interactions and exchanges connoted large 
benefits to individuals within groups, but they also afforded the potential for substantial 
costs. Individuals who violate social norms in domains related to reciprocity impose high 
costs on other group members by reaping benefits associated with group living without 
paying the involved costs. By violating a norm (e.g., by stealing), individuals impose 
costs to other group members either directly, by interacting with a specific person in a
costly manor (e.g., stealing something from them or lying to them), or indirectly, by 
disrupting the nature of the group’s social contract (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). These 
indirect costs may range from decreased group reciprocity norms due to the potential 
costs of non-reciprocity to a greater potential for direct costs from an at-large norm 
violator. Thus, for the benefits of group living to exceed the potential costs of social-
contract violators, a system under which social parasites are punished must develop 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, 1992).   
And indeed, humans do engage in third-party punishment. Even when not directly 
affected by a norm violation, people will sacrifice their own money in experimental 
economics games to punish norm violators (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gachter, 
2002; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O’Brien, 2007), and they will endorse similar monetary fines 
as punishments (Lieberman & Link, 2007). It is possible that moral disgust motivates 
such third-party punishments.    
Second- and third-party punishments connote different benefits but similar costs, 
and thus require different behavioral actions. Second-party punishment (i.e., punishment 
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enacted by the individual who has been directly victimized) may have evolved as a means 
of recouping stolen resources, or as a method of discouraging further abuses in 
subsequent interactions (Kurzban, et al., 2007). Third-party punishment, on the other 
hand, may have evolved as a costly signal of quality (Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001), as 
advertisement for knowledge and endorsement of social norms (and thus viability as a 
social partner, Barclay, 2006), or as preventative action in the event that the norm 
violator may impose direct costs in the future. The benefits of punishing may vary 
considerably depending on second-party or third-party context. By punishing a norm 
violator imposing direct costs, one may recoup resources may discourage future 
violations. By punishing a norm violator imposing indirect costs, one may gain 
reputational benefits or avoid future costly interactions with a poor social partner. The 
latter benefits will usually be lower than the former.
However, the gross costs of punishing should not vary considerably across third 
and second party contexts. Directly aggressive confrontation, such as physical violence or 
verbal aggression, may put an individual at risk for violent retribution. Because the 
benefits of third-party punishment are lower than those of second-party punishment, 
identical behavioral strategies may be inappropriate for the two categories. Whereas 
direct aggressiveness may be a superior strategy for dealing with behaviors resulting in 
direct costs, indirect aggression and social exclusion may be better options for dealing 
with behaviors imposing indirect costs. 
Anger motivates direct confrontation (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), and it is 
associated with social punishment (Kurzban, et al., 2007). However, because behaviors 
motivated by anger (e.g., direct aggression) can carry high costs, mostly related to 
41
physical retribution (Campbell, 2005), behaviors associated with third-party punishment 
may be motivated by another emotion. This emotion would motivate punitive behaviors, 
including social exclusion and indirect aggression. This emotion is what is commonly 
referred to as moral disgust.
The Evolution of Moral Disgust
Pathogen disgust motivates social avoidance and stigmatiztion of infected 
conspecifics (Kurzban & Leary, 2001), and selection may have co-opted pathogen and/or 
sexual disgust for the purpose of motivating punitive behaviors when the potential costs 
of direct aggression (motivated by anger) are inappropriate for the potential benefits 
acquired from punishing. One form of punishment may be social avoidance, wherein an 
individual is excluded from gaining the benefits associated with intragroup reciprocity. 
The general proximal avoidance of infected others motivated by pathogen disgust, or the 
avoidance of specific (sexual) acts with poor quality mates motivated by sexual disgust, 
are somewhat similar to the social avoidance that may be motivated by moral disgust.  
It’s been suggested that moral disgust functions to motivate avoidance of a moral 
violator, and that this avoidance not only removes one from a moral “threat” but also 
punishes and ostracizes the offender (Curtis, 2001). The moral avoidance hypothesis 
suggests that moral disgust motivates proximal avoidance just as pathogen disgust does.  
Avoidance, however, is not the ultimate behavioral function of moral disgust, but one of 
many behavioral strategies that may result in its ultimate function, which is social 
punishment. Unlike interaction with individuals who are pathogenically infectious, 
proximity to an anti-social individual carries no explicit costs. Conceivably, interacting in 
a friendly manner in close proximity with someone who is a renowned cheater may result 
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in some stigma by association, but it is the manner of interaction – not the proximity –
that may carry this cost. One could just as easily engage in some form of punishment 
(e.g., displaying sneering disapproval) toward the same individual from the same 
distance, completely changing the costs and benefits of the interaction. 
Moral Disgust: Is it Really Moral?
Referring to this type of disgust as “moral” is problematic for a few reasons. First, 
it suggests that an act or idea is disgusting because it violates morality. As Haidt (2001) 
argues, moral judgment is likely not a rational deductive process. Instead, it’s the 
attribution of seemingly irrational affect caused by unrecognized motivations. Although 
the disgust someone feels toward another person whom they see stealing from a child 
may be motivated by psychological adaptation for punishing anti-social group members, 
the person feeling disgust doesn’t necessarily recognize the emotion’s ultimate causation. 
They observe the transgression, intuitively feel some form of disgust toward the violator, 
and explain their reaction as related to “morality,” a vague concept that doesn’t 
sufficiently describe the motivation behind their reaction.  
Second, it incorrectly implies that the disgust’s function is related to morality. 
However, regulating morality is not an adaptive problem. Just as I refer to one domain of 
disgust as pathogen disgust because it motivates pathogen avoidance and another domain 
as sexual disgust because it motivates sexual avoidance, it would perhaps be more 
appropriate to refer to the moral kind of disgust as “anti-social disgust” or “norm 
violation disgust” because it motivates punishment of behaviors and ideas deemed 
detrimental to group functioning.
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Third, it threatens to confuse the different disgust domains. Any disgust reaction 
can be labeled as moral (e.g., pathogen disgust toward someone who picks their nose; 
sexual disgust toward the thought of having sex with a stranger) if it is attributed to 
morality. This can potentially create artificial overlap between qualitatively distinct 
domains of pathogen, sexual, and anti-social disgust.  However, because of the frequency 
with which the term “moral disgust” is used to describe anti-social norm violator disgust, 
it seems most simple to maintain the label moral disgust.
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Chapter 5
Individual Differences Across Domains
Disgust sensitivity – the intensity with which individuals feel disgust toward a 
variety of disgust elicitors – is a popular personality construct in psychology. To date, the 
Disgust Scale (DS; Haidt et al., 1994), a self-report measure of disgust sensitivity, has 
been used in over 100 published articles spanning diverse areas of research, including 
studies of social stigma (Smith, Loewenstein, Rozin, Sherriff, & Ubel, 2007), phobias 
(Olatunji, Williams, Sawchuk, & Lohr, 2006), obsessive compulsive disorder (Berle & 
Philips, 2006; Woody & Tolin, 2002), gender roles (Charash, McCay, & Dipaolo, 2006), 
ethnocentrism (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006), attitudes toward body image and the self 
(Fessler & Haley, 2006; Burris & Rempel, 2004), religiosity (Olatunji, Tolin, Huppert, & 
Lohr 2005), homophobia (Olatunji, in press), and eating disorders (Troop, Murphy, 
Bramon, & Treasure, 2000; Troop, Treasure, & Serpell, 2002). Most studies investigating 
how disgust sensitivity relates to other variables have used the DS and almost exclusively 
used the theoretical framework espoused by Rozin et al. (2008), interpreting results in the 
context of a purported animal reminder function of disgust.
Using the alternative theoretical framework discussed in this manuscript, Tybur et 
al. (2009) reexamined individual differences in sensitivity to disgust. The authors started 
by conducting an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on 160 individuals’ disgust ratings of 
48 items. This analysis suggested a three-factor structure of disgust sensitivity, and item 
loadings suggested that these factors reflected pathogen disgust, sexual disgust, and 
moral disgust. The authors replicated this result in a larger sample, and also demonstrated 
that the factor scores related to other constructs in a manner consistent with this 
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theoretical framework. In a third study, the authors trimmed the initial pool of 48 items to
a 27 item measure and used a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examine the factor 
structure of the items. Finally, in a fourth study, the authors presented the 21-item Three 
Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS), which is composed of three mildly to moderately 
correlated factors. The authors compared the TDDS with the DS.  Although the DS 
originally included eight domains (food, animals, body products, death, body envelope 
violations, inappropriate sexual behavior, bad hygiene, magical thinking), it was later 
modified by Olatunji et al. (2007) by eliminating the four items on the sexual domain and 
two additional items that did not covary with other items. The final version of the revised 
DS (DS-R) includes 25 items reflecting three domains: core disgust, animal reminder 
disgust, and contamination disgust.
Tybur et al. (2009) demonstrated that all three of the domains measured on the 
DS-R are strongly interrelated – to the point of being non-distinct – and covary strongly 
with the pathogen domain of the TDDS. Hence, there is little evidence for the DS-R’s 
purported multidimensionality. Rather than measuring distinct disgust domains, it 
appears that the DS-R largely reflects sensitivity to pathogen disgust. Sexual disgust, on 
the other hand, which is included under the umbrella of animal reminder disgust under 
the Rozin et al. (2008) model, does not relate the animal reminder domain of the DS-R 
when the pathogen domain of the TDDS is controlled for. Sensitivity to moral disgust 
also did not covary strongly with the DS-R. In sum, the authors demonstrated that the 
DS-R largely measures the same construct measured by the TDDS pathogen domain, but 
does not measure disgust responses reflected in the sexual or moral domains of the 
TDDS.
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Although the TDDS has good internal consistency (above .80 for each seven-item 
factor), a well-fitting factor structure, demonstrates convergent and discriminant validity 
with sex and the DS-R, and is based on a more well-grounded theoretical framework than 
previous measures of disgust sensitivity, questions remain concerning its measurement 
properties and the nature of the constructs it measures. 
In this manuscript, I present three studies that further explore this new measure. 
Each study includes data clarifying the nature of the constructs included on the TDDS 
and/or includes more information on the measurement properties of the scale than 
reported by Tybur et al. (2009). The first study explores the relationship between the 
three TDDS factors and the NEO PI-3 (McCrae, Costa, & Martin, 2005), which measures 
the dimensions of the Five Factor Model of personality and six facets contained within 
each dimension. The second study tests for relationships between the three TDDS factors 
and political ideology, which could theoretically relate to sensitivity to pathogen, sexual, 
and/or moral disgust. The third study tests for sex differences in the factor structure, 
factor loadings, factor means, and factor covariances of the TDDS using configural and 
structural CFA invariance analyses.
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Chapter 6
Study 1: Disgust Sensitivity and the Five Factor Model
A large body of work has shown that individuals vary in the degree to which they 
find things disgusting. Variance in disgust responses toward items on Haidt et al.’s 
(1994) Disgust Scale has been shown to relate to a variety of psychological constructs. 
However, the nature of disgust sensitivity as a theoretical construct is not well 
understood. Only limited work has investigated disgust sensitivity in light of validated 
personality constructs. Notably, in developing the DS, Haidt et al. reported a positive 
correlation between the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) 
neuroticism factor (r = .23) and a negative correlation with the psychoticism factor (r = -
.25), but no relationship with the extraversion factor (r = -.06). They also reported a 
negative correlation with Zuckerman’s (1979) sensation seeking scale (r = -.46). In 
exploring relationships between the DS and Five Factor Model (FFM) dimensions, as 
measured by the NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrea, 1992), Druschel and Sherman (1999) 
found disgust sensitivity to be positively related to neuroticism (r = .45), agreeableness 
(r = .22), and conscientiousness (r = .35), negatively related to openness (r = -.28), and 
unrelated to extraversion (r = .06). Additionally, studies have reported a sex difference on 
the DS, with women reporting greater disgust sensitivity than men (Haidt et al., 1994; 
Druschel & Sherman, 1999).
These findings provide some information about the nature of disgust sensitivity. 
As measured by the DS, individuals higher in disgust sensitivity are more prone to 
experience negative emotions, more compassionate and friendly, less regimented, and 
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less open to new ideas and experiences. However, two major issues limit the utility of 
these findings.
First, although the DS is used as a measure of disgust sensitivity, its item content 
suggests that it may measure some other construct as well. In constructing the measure, 
Haidt et al. (1994) designed half of the items with a true/false response format. Although 
these items were intended to reflect disgust sensitivity, several of them are arguably only 
tenuously related to disgust, and several seem to be more strongly related to Five Factor 
Model dimensions. Examples of such problematic items include “I might be willing to eat 
monkey meat, under some circumstances,” “It would bother me to see a rat run across my 
path in a park,” “It bothers me to hear someone clear a throat full of mucous,” “I think 
homosexual activities are immoral,” “I would go out of my way to avoid walking through 
a graveyard,” and “It would bother me to sleep in a nice hotel room if I knew that a man 
had died of a heart attack in that room the night before.” The reported correlations 
between total DS scores and other constructs may be driven by whatever underlies 
endorsements of such statements rather than by disgust sensitivity.
Second, although the DS is labeled as a measure of disgust sensitivity, it only 
addresses a limited component of the range of disgust experiences. Haidt et al. (1994) 
constructed the measure with the goal of tapping eight separate domains (food, animals, 
body products, sex, envelope violations, death, hygiene, and magical thinking), but an 
exploratory factor analysis suggested that the scale largely reflects a single factor, with 
limited domain specificity. Additionally, despite their treatment as adequate measures in 
a plethora of studies (e.g., Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000; Fessler & 
Navarrete, 2003; Goldenberg et al., 2001; Rozin, Taylor, Ross, Bennett, & Heimadi, 
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2005; Troop et al., 2002), the subscale demonstrated unacceptably low internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .34 to .60, with a mean of .48).
From the perspective offered by Tybur et al. (2009), the DS is largely a measure 
of sensitivity to pathogen disgust, but it also may include (unintended) additional 
elements tapping traits such as agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. 
Hence, although the DS was designed to be multidimensional, the dimensions it was 
intended to tap are largely related to pathogen disgust, but minimally (if at all) related to 
sexual disgust or moral disgust. All investigations into the nature of disgust sensitivity as 
a theoretical construct, as measured by the DS, have thus been limited in that they only 
have considered sensitivity to pathogen disgust, and have used a scale with questionable 
measurement properties.
In this study, I intend to explore the nature of disgust sensitivity with the TDDS, 
which more straightforwardly measures individual differences in disgust sensitivity, has a 
superior response format (i.e., seven point likert-type scales rather than a combination of 
three-point responses and true/false items), and includes not only sensitivity to pathogen 
disgust, but also sensitivity to sexual disgust and moral disgust. Specifically, I will test 
for relationships between the Five Factor Model dimensions of agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, openness, and neuroticism – and facets subsumed within 
these dimensions – with sensitivity to pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust.
The purpose of this study is largely exploratory. Given that the TDDS is a new 
measure, not much is known about the nature of the constructs it measures. However, 
some predictions can be made regarding relations between FFM dimensions and the 
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factors of the TDDS. These predictions can be made based on prior empirical work and 
from the theoretical perspective motivating the development of the TDDS.
Theoretically, sensitivity to pathogen disgust may relate positively to neuroticism, 
negatively to openness to experience, and negatively to extraversion. As described by 
Schaller and Murray (2008), both openness to new ideas and frequent social contact may 
increase disease risk. Many social norms related to personal hygiene, food preparation, 
and sanitation may in fact function as cultural institutions designed to combat pathogens 
(Sherman & Billing, 1999). And high extraversion, while associated with numerous 
social benefits, is also associated with greater risk for negative outcomes, including 
illness (Nettle, 2006). Neuroticism is defined as negative emotional instability; neurotic 
individuals vacillate easily between states of fear, sadness, guilt, and anxiety. Such low 
thresholds for emotional activation may function to motivate rapid response to threat 
(Nettle, 2006), including pathogen threats. Thus, sensitivity to pathogen disgust may 
relate positively to neuroticism, negatively to extraversion, and negatively to openness, 
given their potential common relation to disease avoidance.
Sensitivity to sexual disgust may also relate negatively to openness. High 
openness potentially connotes fitness benefits – new ideas can be superior to current 
habits across several domains, be them child rearing, foraging, hygiene, or reproductive 
strategy – but can also increase potential costs, given established norms and manners of 
thinking may serve an important function for the local ecology. Sexuality is one domain 
in which a relatively constrained set of attitudes and behaviors have been selected for. Of 
all sexual behaviors possible, individuals tend to engage mostly in intercourse with 
members of the same species, of the opposite sex, of no close kinship, and of a similar 
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mate value. These constraints are reasonable in light of the energetic costs, opportunity 
costs, and disease costs of departing from normative behaviors. However, various other 
sexual behaviors (e.g., oral sex, kissing) may connote benefits as well, and individuals 
who are more open to new ideas and experiences – individuals who are more willing to 
pay the costs associated with departing from norms – may be less disgusted by less 
restrictive sexual behaviors.
Finally, sensitivity to moral disgust may be related to agreeableness and 
conscientiousness. Moral disgust appears to motivate avoidance and sanctioning of anti-
social individuals and ideas, and behaviors associated with agreeableness seem to 
promote ingroup cooperation and cohesion (Heaven, 1996). Thus, individuals who are 
more invested in promoting ingroup cooperation may be more disgusted by anti-social 
acts like lying, cheating, stealing, and non-reciprocating. Similarly, conscientious 
individuals tend to value orderliness, responsibility, and self-control. Individuals who lie, 
cheat, and steal – who engaged in parasitic social behaviors – may threaten highly 
conscientious individuals, who invest high amounts of effort into productivity. 
Additional predictions can be made based on past empirical results. Although 
results from Druschel and Sherman (1999) and Haidt et al. (1994) should be interpreted 
with caution given the ambiguity of the construct measured by the DS, the suggest that 
sensitivity to pathogen disgust – which is highly correlated with the DS – may relate 
positively to neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, and negatively to 
openness. Cross-cultural data reported by Schaller and Murray (2008) suggest that 
sensitivity to pathogen disgust may relate negatively to both openness and extraversion.
Miller et al. (2004) found that frequency of risky sexual behaviors – which are 
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theoretically more appealing to individuals low in sensitivity to sexual disgust – is related 
positively to extraversion, and negatively to openness and agreeableness. Additionally, in 
the development of the TDDS, Tybur et al. (2009) found that sensitivity to pathogen 
disgust was related to neuroticism, sensitivity to sexual disgust was related positively to 
agreeableness and conscientiousness, and negatively to openness, and sensitivity to moral 
disgust was related positively to conscientiousness, agreeableness, and extraversion. 
These results were obtained with a preliminary version of the TDDS, and with the BFI –
a short form of the FFI. Better validated and reliable measures of disgust sensitivity and 
FFM dimensions may yield different results.
In this study, these predictions based on what is known or inferred about variation 
in disgust sensitivity and FFM dimensions will be tested using the TDDS and the NEO-
PI-3 (McCrae, Costa, & Martin, 2005), which measures the dimensions of the FFM as 
well as six facets subsumed under each dimension. In addition to testing the predictions 
outlined above, this study is also intended to be somewhat exploratory and descriptive. 
Given the TDDS is a newly published measure, it is important to improve understanding 
of the constructs it measures, and the NEO-PI-3, a reliable and valid measure of the FFM 
offers the opportunity to gain information about disgust sensitivity as measured by the 
TDDS.
Method
Participants
Four hundred eighty four undergraduates (326 women; 154 men) at the University 
of New Mexico completed a paper-pencil survey in exchange for course credit. 
Participant age was typical for this type of sample (M = 19.88, SD = 3.05).
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Measures
Participants completed the TDDS (see Appendix A) and the NEO-PI-3 (see 
Appendix B). The TDDS is a 21-item measure which includes seven items on each of 
three domains (pathogen, sexual, and moral). Each item is measured on a seven-point 
likert-type scale with 0 indicating that an item is “not at all disgusting” and 6 indicating 
that an item is “extremely disgusting.” The NEO-PI-3 is a 240-item measure that includes 
48 items on each of five dimensions in the FFM. Each of these 48 items includes six sets 
of eight items that measure facets included under the FFM dimensions. 
Results
Scores on the TDDS pathogen, sexual, and moral factors, and on the NEO-PI-3 
FFM dimension factors are sufficiently reliable (all Cronbach’s alphas above .80). 
However, the facet scales on the NEO-PI-3 have a wide range of internal consistency 
(alphas below .60 and above .80). Given that differences in reliability can result in 
illusory differences in correlations (see Chapman & Chapman, 1973), and given that 
relationships between reliable measures are still attenuated by measurement error, 
correlations between the TDDS and NEO-PI-3 dimensions and facets were tested using 
structural equation modeling, which explicitly models measurement error and more 
accurately measures relationships between latent variables than do Pearson correlations 
between unit-weighted composites. 
Within structural equation modeling, good model fit (i.e., a good correspondence 
between the observed covariances between variables and the covariances specified within 
the model being tested) is necessary for accurate parameter estimates (Kline, 2005). 
Given that multidimensional models using individual items as indicators rarely fit the 
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data well (see Ferrando & Lorenzo-Seva, 2000; McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, Bond, & 
Paunonen, 1996), items were bundled into parcels for each facet on the NEO-PI-3 and 
each factor on the TDDS. Parcels were created by averaging every third items on each 
TDDS factor and NEO-PI-3 factor to create nice parcels for the TDDS and 90 parcels for 
the NEO-PI-3. Because, even after bundling items, the NEO-PI-3 still had 90 item 
parcels, relationships between TDDS factors and NEO-PI-3 factors and facets were 
examined for each FFM dimension separately.
Two models were specified for each of the NEO-PI-3 factors (i.e., two models per 
dimension). In the first, the three TDDS factors was measured by three parcels each, and 
each of the six facets in the FFM dimension were measured by three parcels each, and all 
nine latent variables (three TDDS factors and six NEO-PI-3 facets) were free to covary. 
In the second, a tenth latent variable – the FFM dimension that the six latent variables 
measure – was specified as a second-order factor measured by the six facet-level latent 
variables, and the three TDDS factors were allowed to covary with each other and the 
FFM dimension. To summarize, for each of the FFM dimensions, one model allowed for 
relationships between the TDDS factors and NEO-PI-3 facets, and one model allowed for 
relationships between the TTDS factors and NEO-PI-3 higher order factors. Hence, a 
total of ten models were specified. The standardized observed covariances between the 
latent variables in the models are correlations between TDDS factors and each of the 
NEO-PI-3 factors and facets.
All ten models demonstrated acceptable fit, with CFIs no lower than .901, and 
RMSEAs no lower than .061. Thus, covariances between latent variables can be 
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interpreted as reliable estimates. All correlations are reported in Table 1, and all 
correlations are reported below as being significant or non-significant at the .05 level.
At NEO-PI-3 factor levels, sensitivity to pathogen disgust was significantly 
positively related to neuroticism, r = .13, and significantly negatively related to openness, 
r = -.29, but unrelated to agreeableness, r = -.12, extraversion, r = -.05, and 
conscientiousness, r = .01. Sensitivity to sexual disgust was significantly positively 
related to agreeableness, r = .31, neuroticism, r = .14, and conscientiousness, r = .11, and 
negatively related to openness, r = -.36, but unrelated to extraversion, r = .08. Sensitivity 
to moral disgust was significantly positively related to agreeableness, r = .35, 
conscientiousness, r = .31, and extraversion, r = .14, and negatively to neuroticism, r = -
.12, but unrelated to openness, r = .04. 
All correlations between NEO-PI-3 facets are reported in Table 1. These 
correlations were derived from the second five models, each of which allowed for 
covariances between the TDDS factors and each facet within a single FFM dimension. 
Given that each facet is highly related to the other five facets that also measure a FFM 
dimension, it is unclear if any extra information is obtained by interpreting facet-level 
relationships versus factor-level relationships. Thus a technique described by Cheung and 
Chan (2004) was employed to test the null hypothesis that each individual facet level 
covariance with each TDDS factor was the same as the other facet level correlations 
within the FFM dimension. The five facet-level models were rerun constraining the 
covariances between TDDS factors and NEO-PI-3 facets to equal the average covariance 
between the TDDS factor and the six facets. So, for example, after all covariances 
between Openness facets and TDDS factors were estimated, a model was run in which 
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the covariances between all six facets and sensitivity to moral disgust were constrained to 
equality, all six facets and sensitivity to sexual disgust were constrained to equality, and 
all six facets and sensitivity to pathogen disgust were constrained to equality. Chi-square 
tests of model fit were compared with the model in which these covariances were freely 
estimated, and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests were conducted to determine which (if 
any) covariances should be freely estimated rather than fixed. This technique is 
analogous to a test of differences between dependent correlations.  
Four of the five models in which the covariances were fixed to the average 
separate covariance between facets and TDDS factors fit the data less well than models in 
which the covariances were freely estimated (all 2, with 18 degrees of freedom, were 
above the critical value of 28.87). Only the model in which the agreeable facet 
covariances were constrained to equality did not fit the data worse, 2 (8, N = 484) = 
24.17, p > .05. The LM tests for the four poorer fitting models were examined to 
determine which facet level covariances were unique. In total, only eight of the 90 facet-
TDDS covariances were different from the other covariances within the FFM dimensions, 
and none of the differences were striking. These included unique relationships between 
sensitivity to moral disgust and fantasy (openness; r = -.14), ideas (openness; r = .14), 
anxiety (neuroticism; r = .01), and between sensitivity to sexual disgust and feelings 
(openness; r = -.09), angry hostility (neuroticism; r = -.04), impulsiveness (neuroticism; r 
= -.01), excitement seeking (extraversion; r = -.25), and deliberation (conscientiousness; r 
= .25).
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Table 1.
Correlations Between TDDS Factors and NEO-PI-3 Factors and Facets
NEO-PI-3 Factor/Facet Moral Sexual Pathogen
Agreeableness 0.35 0.31 -0.12
     Trust 0.17 0.08 -0.17
     Straightforwardness 0.34 0.34 -0.05
     Altruism 0.30 0.22 -0.05
     Compliance 0.16 0.18 -0.12
     Modesty 0.24 0.23 -0.05
     Tender-Mindedness 0.15* 0.16 -0.12
Openness 0.04 -0.36 -0.29
     Fantasy -0.14* -0.29 -0.22
     Aesthetics 0.04 -0.13 -0.17
     Feelings 0.10 -0.09* -0.17
     Actions -0.09 -0.34 -0.22
     Ideas 0.14* -0.32 -0.25
     Values -0.11 -0.41 -0.24
Neuroticism -0.12 0.14 0.13
     Anxiety 0.01* 0.2 0.17
     Angry Hostility -0.16 -0.04* 0.14
     Depression -0.10 0.09 0.04
     Self-Consciousness -0.08 0.11 0.08
     Impulsiveness -0.12 -0.01* 0.13
     Vulnerability -0.17 0.21 0.16
Extraversion 0.14 0.08 -0.05
     Warmth 0.22 0.13 -0.11
     Gregariousness 0.04 0.05 0.01
     Assertiveness 0.08 -0.05 -0.09
     Activity 0.10 0.01 0.00
     Excitement-Seeking -0.01 -0.25* 0.03
     Positive Emotions 0.13 0.19* -0.05
Conscientiousness 0.31 0.11 0.01
     Competence 0.25 0.01 -0.06
     Order 0.16 0.16 0.11
     Dutifulness 0.41 0.12 0.06
     Achievement Striving 0.33 0.13 0.04
     Self-Discipline 0.22 0.06 -0.03
     Deliberation 0.27 0.25* -0.01
Note: Bolded font indicates significance at the .05 level. Asterisks indicate that facet 
covariances are significantly different than the average of others within that factor
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Discussion
To an extent, the patterns of relationships between FFM dimensions and disgust 
domains were consistent with purported functions of disgust. Interpreting only 
relationships that accounted for at least eight percent of the variance in TDDS factors 
(i.e., correlations above .28), individuals who were more disgusted by moral 
transgressions were more agreeable – more trusting, friendly, and generous – and more 
oriented toward organization, efficiency, and hard work. This suggests that those 
individuals especially likely to pay costs imposed by the anti-social are especially 
disgusted, and, conceivably, motivated to avoid and punish such individuals. However, 
sensitivity to moral disgust was not (or not strongly) related to openness to new ideas, 
emotional instability, or extraversion. 
Individuals who were more disgusted by non-normative sexuality were also less 
open to new ideas. Such individuals were less dreamy and imaginative (fantasy facet), 
less artistic and original (aesthetics facet), less adventurous and optimistic (actions facet), 
less inventive and curious (ideas facet), and more conservative and cautious (values 
facet). Notably, of the openness facets, only feelings (being excitable, spontaneous, 
insightful), which is also related to neuroticism and extraversion (Costa & McCrae, 
1992), was unrelated to sensitivity to sexual disgust. These findings are consistent with 
previous research indicating that less sexually adventurous individuals are less open to 
experience (Miller et al., 2004). Agreeableness was also related to sensitivity to sexual 
disgust. This was not predicted from theory, but is consistent with results from Tybur et 
al. (2009). Perhaps deviations from normative sexuality threatens to impose costs on 
individuals who are follow social guidelines, and individuals who are more invested in 
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prosociality are more avoidance of such deviations from sexual norms. Sensitivity to 
sexual disgust was only weakly related, or unrelated, to neuroticism, extraversion, and 
conscientiousness.
Individuals who were more disgusted by infection risks were also less open to 
experience, and this relationship was quite stable across openness facets. This lends 
further support to arguments by Schaller and Murray (2008) and Thornhill et al. (2009) 
that orientation toward traditional ideas – and a lack of interest in novelty – may function 
to reduce threats posed by diseases. Such “conventions” may be locally developed (e.g., 
only eat meat if it is prepared in this specific manner; eat specific foods when they are 
accompanied by anti-microbial seasonings) or may be norms that are theoretically stable 
across culture (e.g., don’t play with feces). Contrary to other reasonable predictions – that 
lower extraversion and higher neuroticism would be associated with lower sensitivity to 
pathogen disgust – this was the only strong relationship found between sensitivity to 
pathogen disgust and FFM dimensions. This suggests that, at least in the population 
sampled from in this study, disease avoidance concerns may not influence the degree to 
which individuals are oriented to socialize and with others, or the ease with which people 
experience negative emotions. 
The lack of symmetry between these results and those found using the DS 
(Druschel & Sherman, 1999) further suggests that the construct measured with the DS, 
while strongly related to sensitivity to pathogen disgust, is somewhat different. Several of 
the binary items on the DS ask about being “bothered” by other individuals (e.g., 
someone clearing their throat; someone taking a glass eye out of their eye socket); such 
items may influence how the DS related to agreeableness and neuroticism. It is unclear 
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why the DS would relate to conscientiousness, as reported by Druschel and Sherman 
(1999), but the correlation between sensitivity to pathogen disgust and conscientiousness 
was .01 in this study.
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Chapter 7
Study 2: Disgust sensitivity and political ideology
Like research on disgust, research related to political ideology has recently 
become much more common in psychology (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Researchers 
have gained a better understanding of the genetic bases of ideology (Alford, Funk, & 
Hibbing, 2005; Bouchard, Segal, Tellegen, McGue, Keyes, & Krueger, 2003), the neural 
correlates of ideology (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee 2007) how it ideology develops 
across the lifespan (Block & Block, 2006), and how it relates to a number of personality 
constructs, including avoidant attachment (Thornhill & Fincher, 2008), openness to 
experience and conscientiousness (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Jost, 2006). 
Ultimately, syntheses of such findings can improve understanding of the motivations of 
ideology and its nature as a personality construct (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 
2003; Jost et al., 2008).
Given the increasing interest in both disgust and ideology, an investigation of how 
ideology relates to disgust may mutually inform both areas of study. Despite recent 
advances in the understanding of the function of disgust, there remain a number of 
questions regarding how the emotion operates across different contexts. An examination 
of how disgust operates in the political realm can improve the understanding of how 
disgust operates specifically in politics, and perhaps how the emotion functions in 
general. Similarly, despite recent advances that have placed ideology within a 
nomological network, there is no consensus as to what motivates ideology or what the 
function of ideology is. Given the disgust-evoking nature of many ideological concepts –
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and given the varied nature of disgust – differential relationships between ideology and 
varied disgust domains may inform theoretical models of ideology.
Different theoretical models of ideology suggest that each disgust domain may 
relate to conservativism. Some have suggested that, among other things, ideologically 
relevant traits such as collectivism, xenophobia, and adherence to localized social norms 
function to neutralize threats posed by pathogens (e.g., Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & 
Duncan, 2004; Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; 
Schaller & Murray, 2008; Thornhill et al., 2009). This model implies that certain norms 
(e.g., food preparation, hygiene and grooming) may function to neutralize threats posed 
by pathogens within a specific environment, and xenophobia may function to neutralize 
the threat of infection from outgroups possessing novel pathogens for which the ingroup 
does not possess sufficient immunity. Researchers have found empirical support for this 
model: cross-culturally, nations’ pathogen prevalence is positively related to the average 
conservativism (Thornhill et al., 2009) and collectivism (Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & 
Schaller, 2008) of individuals within those cultures, and negatively related to average 
openness to experience (Schaller & Murray, 2008). Given that disgust toward pathogen 
cues presumably functions to motivate disease avoidance (Curtis & Biran, 2001; Oaten et 
al., 2009; Tybur et al., 2009), those who are more sensitive to pathogen disgust (and, 
presumably, more invested in avoiding disease) may also be more conservative. 
Moreover, associations have been found between measures of disgust sensitivity 
conceptually and empirically related to disease-avoidance and conservativism (Inbar et 
al, in press) and Right Wing Authoritarianism (Hodson & Costello, 2007). 
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At the same time, many “hot button” issues for contemporary social conservatives 
concern disapproval of “deviant” sexuality (e.g., pornography, anal sex, homosexuality, 
sex education), and conservativism is associated with negativity toward non-normative 
sexual practices and sex in general (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Jost et al., 2008). Additionally, 
sexual strategies have been shown to relate to ideology. Individuals higher in Social 
Dominance Orientation have more traditional sexual strategies, which produce unequal 
social relationships between men and women (Pratto & Hegarty, 2000). Given that the 
sexual domain of the TDDS largely includes items related to non-traditional sexual 
practices (e.g., oral sex, anal sex, unwanted sexual contact), conservativism may relate to 
sensitivity to sexual disgust.  
Further, conservativism predicts the subjective importance of “moral values” in 
voting decisions (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Moreover, conservatives can be viewed as 
“ingroup specialists” who may be more invested in group-level norms related to honesty 
and reciprocity (Thornhill & Fincher, 2007). Given that the moral domain of the TDDS 
reflects disgust toward acts violating pro-social norms related to honesty and reciprocity, 
conservativism may also relate to sensitivity to moral disgust.  
Finally, it is unclear how disgust expressed in the political realm relates to the 
domains measured by the TDDS. That is, the disgust expressed toward politically 
relevant issues may reflect pathogen, sexual, or moral disgust, or perhaps none of the 
domains included in the TDDS. The current study thus includes three broad goals: 1) to 
clarify the relationship between conservativism and the three domains of disgust 
measured on the TDDS, 2) to use disgust sensitivity as a means of testing several 
hypotheses related to the nature of conservativism, and 3) to examine the relationship 
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between disgust toward political issues and disgust toward pathogens, sexuality, and 
immorality.
Method
Participants
Two hundred fifty three undergraduate students (211 women; mean age = 20.4 
years) from a public state university participated in exchange for course credit. 
Participants completed the study online in exchange for class credit in late 2007 and early 
2008.
Measures
Ideology has been measured in several ways, often with a single, Likert-type 
“liberal-conservative” item (e.g., Carney et al., 2008), with measures that assess attitudes 
toward a variety of political issues (e.g., Eysenk, 1951; Thornhill & Fincher, 2007; 
Wilson, 1989), or with some combination of the two (e.g., Block & Block, 2006; Tybur 
et al., 2007; see Knight, 1999, for a summary). In this study, conservativism was 
measured with 13 items (see Appendix C), 4 of which asked participants their agreement 
with broad statements regarding ideology or political party preference (e.g., I consider 
myself to be politically liberal; I often identify with the policies of the Republican Party) 
and 9 of which asked participants their agreement with statements about specific political 
issues (e.g., I think that our gun control laws are too strict; I think that homosexuals 
should have the same marriage rights as heterosexuals). Each item was scored on a 0 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) Likert-type scale. A principle components 
analysis (PCA) on the 13 items suggested that they reflected a unidimensional construct, 
with the top four eigenvalues being 4.31, 1.41, 1.18, and 1.01. After reverse scoring items 
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for which high scores indicated liberalism, the 13 items were unit-weighted to create a 
measure of conservativism ( = .81). 
Several disgust measures were also collected. Participants completed the TDDS. 
Seven items in each domain were unit-weighted to form three internally reliable 
composites ( = .83, .85, .87, respectively). Participants also reported their disgust 
responses to 5 political items (see Appendix D) designed to be objectionable to liberals 
(The 2003 invasion of Iraq; Tax cuts for the wealthy; then-current President George W. 
Bush; Republicans’ values; Teaching intelligent design in high school classrooms) and 5 
designed to be objectionable to conservatives (Abortion in the first trimester of 
pregnancy; Burning the American flag; Former U.S. President Bill Clinton; Gay 
marriage; Democrats’ values). Separate PCAs on each of the five item sets suggested that 
they measured unidimensional constructs, with eigenvalues of 2.41, .86, .80, .53, and .40 
for disgust toward liberals, and eigenvalues of 2.51, .96, .78, .47, and .29 for disgust 
toward conservatives. Both item sets were separately unit-weighted ( = .72 for both 
measures; the two measures were correlated, r = -.38). These composite variables are 
subsequently referred to as disgust toward conservatives and disgust toward liberals.
Results
How does the Three Domain Disgust Scale relate to conservativism?
Bivariate correlations suggested that conservativism is related to sensitivity to 
sexual disgust, r = .25, p < .001, and moral disgust, r = .13, p < .05, but not pathogen 
disgust, r = .06, p = .31. Given that these disgust domains share some statistical and 
theoretical overlap, conservativism was then regressed simultaneously on sensitivity to 
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pathogen disgust, sexual disgust, and moral disgust, and sex1 and age (see Table 2). The 
relationship between sensitivity to moral disgust and conservativism was no longer 
significant, rsp = .06, p = .34, and the relationship between sensitivity to pathogen disgust 
and conservativism remained non-significant, rsp = -.05, p = .43. Only sensitivity to 
sexual disgust, rsp = .23, p < .001 was uniquely related to conservativism.
Table 2.
Bivariate and Semi-Partial Correlations Between Sensitivity to Disgust and 
Conservativism
Predictor r p rsp p
Participant Sex 0.01 0.97 0.15 0.01
Participant Age -0.15 0.02 -0.10 0.10
Sensitivity to Pathogen Disgust 0.06 0.31 -0.05 0.43
Sensitivity to Sexual Disgust 0.25 <.001 0.23 <.001
Sensitivity to Moral Disgust 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.34
How does political disgust relate to pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust?
The next analyses focused on how disgust toward liberals and conservatives 
relates to pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust. First, an omnibus repeated-measures 
MANCOVA was conducted to determine how disgust sensitivity predicted disgust 
toward liberals and disgust toward conservatives (see Table 3). The two political disgust 
variables were treated as levels of a within-subjects factor, participant sex was treated as 
a between-subjects factor, and age, conservativism, and sensitivity to pathogen disgust, 
sexual disgust, and moral disgust were treated as continuous factors, as were interactions 
between conservativism and each of the three disgust domains. This analysis tested for 
two- and three-way interactions involving level of political disgust. For example, 
                                                
1 Fisher z-tests for differences between independent correlations suggested no significant 
sex differences between conservativism and the three disgust domains.  
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interaction effects would indicate that a specific domain of disgust differentially relates to 
the two political disgust variables. There was a strong two-way interaction between 
conservativism and level of the within-subjects factor, F(1, 243) = 487.34, p < .001 
(conservativism was positively related to disgust toward liberals, ß = .64, p < .001, r2sp = 
.36, but negatively related to disgust toward conservatives, ß = -.72, p < .001, r2sp = .46; 
see Table 2), but none of the other predictors differentially related to disgust toward 
liberals versus conservatives. Only one three-way interaction was significant: sensitivity 
to moral disgust was moderated by conservativism differently in predicting disgust 
toward liberals versus disgust toward conservatives, F(1, 243) = 13.62, p < .001.
Table 3.
Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Weights Predicting Disgust Toward 
Liberals and Disgust Toward Conservatives 
Disgust Toward Liberals Disgust Toward Conservatives
Predictor b B p b B p
Participant Sex 0.32 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.33
Participant Age -0.01 -0.02 0.60 -0.01 -0.03 0.53
Sensitivity to Moral Disgust 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.17 0.16 <0.01
Sensitivity to Sexual Disgust 0.24 0.25 <0.01 0.10 0.11 0.08
Sensitivity to Pathogen Disgust 0.01 0.01 0.81 <0.01 <0.01 0.97
Conservativism 1.28 0.64 <0.01 -1.39 -0.72 <0.01
Moral Disgust * Conservativism 0.22 0.16 <0.01 -0.10 -0.08 0.13
Sexual Disgust * Conservativism 0.06 0.05 0.30 0.07 0.05 0.29
Pathogen Disgust * Conservativism <0.01 <0.01 0.96 0.02 0.01 0.81
Note: Bolded font indicates that the effects differ significantly across levels of the 
dependent variable – across disgust toward liberalism and disgust toward conservativism
Two follow-up analyses were then conducted to investigate this three-way 
interaction, each regressing one level of political disgust (i.e., disgust toward liberalism 
or toward conservativism) on each of the factors included in the omnibus test (see Table 
2 for effects). For disgust toward liberals, only sensitivity to moral disgust was moderated 
by conservativism, t(243) = 3.54, p < .001. Tests of the simple slopes of sensitivity to 
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moral disgust were then computed at different levels of conservativism – at one standard 
deviation above (“conservatives”) and below (“liberals”) the midpoint of the 
conservativism composite – to probe this two-way interaction. For conservatives, 
sensitivity to moral disgust was related to disgust toward liberals, ß = .31, p < .001, r2sp = 
.03; for liberals, sensitivity to moral disgust was unrelated to disgust toward liberalism, ß
= .05, p = .65, r2sp < .01 (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Disgust toward liberals as a function of sensitivity to moral disgust for 
conservatives (ß = .31, p < .001, r2sp = .03) and for liberals (ß = .05, p = .65, r
2
sp < .01)
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For disgust toward conservatives, the interaction between conservativism and 
sensitivity to moral disgust did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, 
t(243) = 1.51, p = .13. However, given the marginal significance of the interaction – and 
the results obtained when disgust toward liberalism was treated as the dependent measure 
– the simple slopes of sensitivity to moral disgust were analyzed at the same levels of 
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conservativism used in the previous analysis. The pattern was opposite, but 
complimentary, to that found in the first analysis: for conservatives, sensitivity to moral 
disgust was unrelated to disgust toward conservatives, ß = .06, p = .49, r2sp < .01; for 
liberals, sensitivity to moral disgust was related to disgust toward conservatives, ß = .19, 
p < .01, r2sp = .02 (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Disgust toward conservativism as a function of sensitivity to moral disgust for 
conservatives (ß = .06, p = .49, r2sp < .01) and for liberals (ß = .19, p < .01, r
2
sp = .02)
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Discussion
Of the TDDS factors, only sensitivity to sexual disgust was uniquely related to 
conservativism. Thus, while conservatives were more disgusted than liberals by 
pornography, oral sex, and promiscuity, they were not more disgusted by lying, cheating, 
and stealing, or by feces, blood, and body odor. These results have implications how 
disgust sensitivity is understood, and for several theories of political ideology.
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First, the relationship between conservativism and sensitivity to sexual disgust is 
consistent with the findings from Study 1, which indicated a relationship with openness, 
and the strongest facet-level correlation (though not significantly differentiated from the 
other facets), was that with the values facet, which is described by Costa and McCrae 
(1992) as liberalism. It is also consistent with findings by Jost et al. (2008) that 
conservativism is associated with negativity toward erotica and sexual activity. This 
underscores arguments by Haidt and Hersh (2001) that attitudes toward sexuality may
play an important role in current ideologically based culture wars. This finding suggests 
that it may be worthwhile to investigate how conservativism relates to regulations of 
sexuality and reproductive behavior. Specifically, as Pratto and Hegarty (2000) suggest, 
political ideology may play a key role in sociocultural regulation of mating strategies.
Although models suggesting that conservativism functions to neutralize pathogen 
threats would predict a relationship between sensitivity to pathogen disgust and 
conservativism, no such relationship was found in this study. There are several potential 
explanations for this null finding. Whereas most of the research based on this model has 
investigated cross-cultural infectious disease prevalence and constructs related to 
conservativism, such as collectivism and openness to experience (Schaller & Murray, 
2008; Thornhill et al., 2009; Fincher et al., 2008) – and results from Study 1 were 
consistent, finding an intracultural relationship between openness and sensitivity to 
pathogen disgust – the current study investigated relations with self-reported political 
ideology. It is possible that several traits related to conservativism (e.g., RWA and SDO, 
as found by Hodson and Costello, 2007) are related to disease-avoidance, but political 
self-identification and policy preferences are not.
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These results are also somewhat contradictory to those found by Inbar et al. (in 
press), who reported a relationship between conservativism and short-forms of the DS 
(Haidt et al., 1994). However, it is difficult to interpret results using the DS. As discussed 
previously, the nature of the construct(s) measured by the DS is unclear, and it is possible 
that a relationship between conservativism and the DS is driven by some of the more 
construct ambiguous items on the DS (e.g., “I try to avoid letting any part of my body 
touch the toilet seat in a public restroom, even when it appears clean). Additionally, the 
form of the DS used by Inbar et al. included items related to sexuality, which likely tap a 
disgust domain empirically and theoretically distinct from pathogen disgust.
It may be worthwhile to reexamine the interpretation of results demonstrating a 
strong relationship between nations’ ideologically-relevant traits and infectious disease 
rates. Although it has been suggested that conservativism motivates physical avoidance 
of outgroup members because outgroup members carry novel pathogens, the evidence for 
this hypothesis has mostly examined parasites that are not primarily transmitted via direct 
contact between humans. For example, Fincher et al. (2008) found a robust relationship 
between nations’ collectivism and pathogen prevalence. However, the index of pathogen 
prevalence included nine pathogens (leishmanias, trypanosomes, malaria, schistosomes, 
filariae, leprosy, dengue, typhus and tuberculosis), most of which are vector-born 
parasites that rely on non-human vectors for transmission (e.g., mosquitoes for malaria 
and dengue; snails for schistosomiasis). Perhaps nations with higher levels of vector-born 
pathogens also have higher levels of interpersonally transmitted pathogens. Or perhaps 
the relationships between nations’ pathogen prevalence and traits such as collectivism 
reflects something other than adaptation for physical avoidance of outgroups (e.g., 
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adherence to group norms that function to neutralize local pathogen threats, an 
explanation also proposed by Fincher et al., 2008, and Schaller and Murry, 2008).
Despite conservatives’ greater emphasis on “moral issues” in political behavior 
(Haidt & Graham, 2007), they are not more disgusted by violations of norms related to 
honesty and reciprocity – violations that largely compose the moral domain of the TDDS. 
This is consistent with arguments made by Haidt and colleagues (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 
2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007) that, of five purported moral 
intuitions (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity/, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and 
purity/sanctity), liberals and conservatives both use fairness/reciprocity and harm/care in 
moral decision making. Hence, while liberals and conservatives do not demonstrate 
greater sensitivity to moral disgust as measured on the TDDS, conservatives may 
moralize a wider array of issues.
In contrast with the modest associations between conservativism and the domains 
on the TDDS, conservativism strongly predicted disgust toward ideologically divergent 
political issues. In itself, this should not be surprising: obviously, those who identify as 
liberals should be expected to report more disgust toward conservative principles, and 
vice-versa. However, the moderating effect of moral disgust – but not sexual or pathogen 
disgust – on the relationships between conservativism and disgust toward political ideas 
informs both the validity of the moral domain of the TDDS and the nature of disgust 
expressed in the political realm.
The moral domain of the TDDS includes items concerning anti-social behaviors 
such as lying, cheating, and stealing. Hence, none of the items concern issues that seem 
specific to liberals or conservatives. And indeed, the weak relationship between 
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conservativism and sensitivity to moral disgust approached zero when controlling for 
other disgust domains. Thus, although the items on the moral domain are endorsed as 
disgusting, are similar to concepts that are described as disgusting and associated with 
facial expressions of disgust in children as young as six (Danovitch & Bloom, 2009), and 
are similar to concepts that activate neural regions associated with disgust (Schaich Borg
et al., 2008) and facial expressions associated with disgust (Chapman et al., 2009), it has 
been unclear if such disgust responses relate to disgust responses to culturally specific 
issues such as flag burning. The results of this study suggest that they do: liberals who 
reported greater disgust to apolitical moral issues also reported greater disgust toward 
conservatives and tax cuts for the wealthy; conservatives who reported greater disgust to 
apolitical moral issues also reported greater disgust toward liberals, abortion, and gay 
marriage. These relationships mutually inform the nature of conservatives’ and liberals’ 
attitudes toward politically conflicting individuals and issues: those who are especially 
disgusted by lying, cheating, and stealing are also especially disgusted by individuals and 
issues of opposing ideologies. This implies that the same processes affecting sensitivity 
to moral disgust – perhaps investment in social norms, group cohesion, honesty, and 
reciprocity – also affect the strength of disgust toward conflicting ideologies.
Future investigations in this area may further explore the results found in this 
study. For example, the relation between sensitivity to sexual disgust and conservativism, 
in concert with previous findings relating sexuality to conservativism, suggests a fruitful 
direction for future research on ideology. Because causal relationships cannot be inferred 
from the results of this study, it is not clear if disgust toward sexuality leads to 
conservativism (e.g., individuals with more restricted attitudes toward sex gravitate 
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toward an ideological orientation that regulates sex), conservativism leads to disgust 
toward sexuality (e.g., conservatives are more oriented toward “traditional” norms, 
including those related to sexuality), or some unexplored construct mediates the 
relationship between the two.
Further, future research may contrast the lack of findings of a relationship 
between sensitivity to pathogen disgust and conservativism in this study with the 
consistent findings of a relationship between cultures’ disease loads and their 
conservativism (or a construct related to conservativism). It is possible that the same 
disease-relevant factors influencing group-level conservativism do not influence 
individual differences in conservativism within a group. Or some quality specific to the 
culture sampled in this study (e.g., low baseline pathogen prevalence) may attenuate the 
relationship between sensitivity to pathogen disgust and conservativism.
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Chapter 8
The Structure of the Three Domain Disgust Scale
Whereas Studies 1 and 2 primarily explored relations between the TDDS and 
other variables in an effort to better understand the nature of disgust sensitivity as a 
theoretical construct, Study 3 addresses the measurement properties of the TDDS. 
Tybur et al. (2009) developed the measure by starting off with a pool of over 100 
disgust elicitors suggested by various undergraduate students, graduate students, 
professors, and community members. These items were reduced to 58 to minimize 
redundancies, eliminate locally idiosyncratic items, and remove items that would 
obviously not yield meaningful variance on a self-report measure. The 58 items were 
given to a sample of undergraduates to rate on the same response scale used for the 
TDDS, and were further parsed to 48 items after removing items with highly non-normal 
distributions. After examining factor loadings across two samples, these 48 items were 
further reduced to 27 items. Two items from each factor were further removed to 
minimize correlated error variances, the final 21-item TDDS was created.
The measurement properties of the TDDS were examined using a sample of 507 
undergraduate psychology students. In this sample, a CFA on the TDDS demonstrated 
good model fit, all factors had acceptable internal consistency, and all items loaded 
moderately to strongly on only the appropriate factors. 
These results are consistent with good measurement properties, but two issues 
constrain their utility: 1) they were gathered on a sample of undergraduate college 
students relatively homogenous on a number of traits (e.g., age, geographic location), 
and, perhaps more importantly, 2) they did not examine how the TDDS might operate 
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differently for the sexes. A key and consistent finding reported by Tybur et al. (2009) was 
the sizeable sex difference in sensitivity to sexual disgust, as compared to modest sex 
differences in sensitivity to pathogen and moral disgust. Given these mean sex 
differences – and the vastly different costs paid by the sexes for sexual “mistakes” – it is 
important to examine sex differences more nuanced measurement properties of the 
TDDS.
In this final study, samples from Studies 1 and 2, from Tybur et al. (2009), and 
from a number of unpublished data sets were combined to allow for appropriate tests of 
invariance in the factor structure, item loadings, and factor variances and covariance 
across the sexes. Two of these samples were obtained from a more age-varied sample 
than that used in Tybur et al. (2009) and Studies 1 and 2 of this manuscript, thus allowing 
for greater generalizability.
Method
Participants
Four thousand one hundred fifty five participants (64.2% female) were pooled 
from nine separate samples, seven of which were undergraduate psychology student 
samples, and two of which were Internet samples. Mean participant age was 28.23 yeas 
(SD = 11.28), with a range from 18 to 78. All participants completed the TDDS and 
reported their age and sex.
Results
First, internal consistency was separately estimated for the sexes for all three 
TDDS factors. All three factors demonstrated good internal consistency across both sexes 
(α = .81, .86, and .87 for men; α = .81, .80, and .86 for women, for pathogen, sexual, and 
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moral disgust, respectively), though sensitivity to sexual disgust was somewhat more 
internally consistent for men than for women.
Next, mean sex differences for the unit-weighted composites were compared 
using separate independent samples t-tests. The sexes differed on each domain (all p’s < 
.00001). Consistent with results reported by Tybur et al. (2009), the degree to which the 
sexes differed on disgust sensitivity varied across domains, F(2, 4162) = 181.61, p < 
.001, with small sex differences on the pathogen factor, d = .20, and moral factor, d = .14, 
but a large sex difference on the sexual factor, d = .74.
Subsequent analyses concerned the dimensionality of the measure, the factor 
loadings of the measure, and the variances and covariances of the three TDDS factors. 
Although such tests could be conducted by visually comparing eigenvalues and factor 
loadings from an exploratory factor analysis, a confirmatory factory analysis (CFA) 
approach is necessary for significance tests of invariance in factor loadings and variances 
across groups.   
An overall CFA on the TDDS was run using EQS 6.1. Each item was constrained 
to load on only the factor it is hypothesized to load. For the entire sample, the data fit the 
model well, 2(186, N = 4163) = 2824.77, p < .01, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .058, SRMR = 
.048. This is comparable to – and even slightly better than – fit reported by Tybur et al. 
(2009). When analyzed separately for each sex, the model fit well for men, 2(186, N = 
1395) = 1044.35, p < .01, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .058, SRMR = .047, and for women, 
2(186, N = 2668) = 1146.56, p < .01, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .061, SRMR = .053. Hence, 
there is evidence that the TDDS measures the same number of dimensions for men and 
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women (dimensional invariance), and the same items load on each dimension between 
the sexes (configural invariance).
Next, metric invariance was examined by constraining the factor loadings of each 
scale item to equality across the sexes (i.e., forcing the items to have the same loadings 
for men and women). Evidence for complete metric invariance would require that this 
model fit the data equally well as the model in which factor loadings are free to vary 
between the sexes. First, a baseline model in which the loadings are free to vary across 
the sexes, and this model is compared to the constrained model. The baseline model 
demonstrated acceptable fit, 2(372, N = 4163) = 3068.44, p < .01, CFI = .91, RMSEA = 
.060, SRMR = .052, and was tested against a metrically invariant model. 
To identify a model, each factor requires one unstandardized factor loading to be 
constrained to 1 (i.e., the marker variable for a factor; Kline, 2005). Thus, 18 items (six 
loadings per factor) were constrained to equality, with the unstandardized loading of the 
first item on each TDDS factor constrained to one. This model did not fit the data as well 
as the previous, 2 (18, N = 4163) = 119.27, p < .01. Because the necessary constraint of 
a single item per factor to one (and thus to equality) does not allow for a test of 
invariance in the factor loading across groups for these variables, multiple models were 
evaluated in which different items were treated as the marker variables. For the final 
analysis of metric invariance, only the items demonstrating the least invariance in 
loadings were treated as marker variables.
In total, seven loadings were not invariant (i.e., were different) across the sexes 
(see Table 4 for all item loadings for both sexes). The items were, with men’s and 
women’s loadings, respectively: Deceiving a friend (.66 versus .71); A stranger of the 
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opposite sex rubbing your thigh in an elevator (.76 versus .60); Having anal sex with 
someone of the opposite sex (.63 versus .56); Hearing two strangers having sex (.78 
versus .62); Performing oral sex (.72 versus .46); Seeing a cockroach run across the floor 
(.61 versus .54); and Accidentally touching a person’s bloody cut (.66 versus .63). 
Although these loadings were somewhat different (indeed, different enough that 
constraining them to equality reduced model fit), they were still consistently of moderate 
to high magnitude. When all loadings except these seven were allowed to vary between 
the sexes, the model fit as well as that in which all loadings were free to vary, 2 (11, N
= 4163) = 7.52, p > .05. 
Next, differences between factor variances and covariances were examined. 
Maintaining the factor loading equality constraints from the previous partial metrically 
invariant model, the factor variances and covariances were constrained to equality for the 
sexes. This model did not fit the data as well as the previous, 2 (6, N = 4163) = 20.44, p
< .01, indicating sex differences in factor variances and covariances. LM tests indicated 
that the sexual and moral factor variances differed across the sexes, as did the 
covariances between the sexual and moral factors (r = .39 for men versus .35 for women) 
and sexual and pathogen factors (r = .55 for men versus .49 for women). Allowing these 
four parameters to differ improved model fit to that observed in the partial metrically 
invariant model, 2 (2, N = 4163) = 4.99, p > .05. Thus, all factor variances and 
covariances differed across the sexes except for variance in sensitivity to pathogen 
disgust and the covariance between sensitivity to pathogen disgust and sensitivity to 
moral disgust (see Table 4).
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Table 4.
Three Domain Disgust Scale factor loadings, variances, and covariances across the 
sexes
Pathogen Sexual Moral
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Standing close to a person who has body 
odor
0.57 0.60
Shaking hands with a stranger who has 
sweaty palms
0.64 0.63
Stepping on dog poop 0.72 0.71
Accidentally touching a person’s bloody cut 0.63 0.60
Seeing some mold on old leftovers in your 
refrigerator
0.73 0.73
Sitting next to someone who has red sores on 
their arm 
0.61 0.54
Seeing a cockroach run across the floor 0.66 0.63
Bringing someone you just met back to your 
room to have sex
0.76 0.73
Watching a pornographic video 0.72 0.63
A stranger of the opposite sex rubbing your 
thigh in an elevator
0.76 0.60
Having anal sex with someone of the 
opposite sex 
0.63 0.56
Hearing two strangers having sex 0.78 0.62
Performing oral sex 0.72 0.46
Finding out that someone you don’t like has 
sexual fantasies about you
0.72 0.66
Forging someone’s signature on a legal 
document
0.67 0.66
Intentionally lying during a business 
transaction 
0.76 0.79
Stealing from a neighbor 0.76 0.73
A student cheating to get good grades 0.66 0.71
Shoplifting a candy bar from a convenience 
store
0.78 0.75
Deceiving a friend 0.68 0.67
Cutting to the front of a line to purchase the 
last few tickets to a show
0.78 0.77
Pathogen 0.77 0.73
Sexual 0.55 0.49 2.40 1.92
Moral 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.35 1.65 1.49
Note: Bolded font indicates lack of invariance across sexes (i.e., sex differences). Intersections between the 
same TDDS factors are variances; intersections between different TDDS factors are standardized 
covariances (i.e., correlations).
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Discussion
Overall, while not operating identically between the sexes, the TDDS 
demonstrated acceptable and similar model fit for both men and women. For both sexes, 
the seven pathogen items measured a single dimension; the seven sexual items measured 
a single dimension; and the seven moral items measured a single dimension. Differences 
that did exist – both in statistically significant lack of invariance and magnitude of 
invariance – largely concerned the sexual disgust factor and items on that factor. That 
such differences exist should not be surprising in light of the vastly different 
consequences of sexual behavior for men and women – differences that theoretically lead 
to the large sex difference in sensitivity to sexual disgust.
Four of the seven sexual disgust items loaded differently for men and women, and 
each had a lower loading for women. This suggests that, for these items, factors beyond 
sensitivity to sexual disgust have greater influence on women’s responses than men’s 
responses. For example, the item “A stranger of the opposite sex rubbing your thigh in an 
elevator,” loads .76 for men and .60 for women. So while a large amount of the variance 
in item responses is accounted for by the sexual disgust factor for both sexes (58% for 
men and 36% for women), it appears that the self-reported disgust response to this item 
for women is less related to sensitivity to sexual disgust, as measured by the TDDS, than 
it is for men. This may in part reflect that sensitivity to sexual disgust is more of a 
heterogeous construct for women than for men. That is, for men, disgust toward oral sex, 
unwanted sexual advances, hearing people having sex, and having anal sex strongly relate 
to an overarching tendency to be disgusted by sexuality. To an extent, women’s disgust 
toward sexuality may be somewhat more compartmentalized – their disgust toward those 
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individual items have less to do with their overall disgust toward sexuality, and are more 
influenced by unmodeled factors. 
For practical measurement purposes, though, the sexual items appear to be 
adequately measuring a single factor for both men and women. Rather than suggesting 
poor measurement properties, these results suggest a new direction for research on sexual 
disgust that involves sex-specific specificity in attitudes toward sexuality. Also, the sex 
difference in the loading for the item “Performing oral sex” was conspicuously different 
than that of the other items (.72 versus .46), and was lower than any other item loading 
for women. Future revisions of the measure may consider replacing this item. 
Additionally, although the difference in the magnitude of the internal consistencies was 
small, these differences could produce artificially higher correlations between sexual 
disgust and other variables for men.
Although the differences in covariances between the factors were very small, they 
may also be theoretically informative. Disgust toward sexual concepts and pathogen cues 
were slightly more related for men than for women, despite the fact that sex puts women 
at higher infection risk than men. Despite the greater infection costs and risks for women, 
perhaps disease-avoidance plays a lower proportionate role in women’s motivation to 
avoid sex. Said another way, even though the absolute costs and risks of disease via sex 
are greater for women, they may be proportionately lower given the costs women pay for 
sex with a lower quality or less compatible partner. 
Disgust toward lying cheating, and stealing was more strongly related to disgust 
toward sexual concepts for men than for women. It is possible that, given the costs 
potentially imposed on women via sex – and men’s role in imposing such costs at their 
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own benefit – men who are more averse to lying, cheating, and stealing are also more 
averse to imposing such costs. Of course, as is the case with the sex difference in the 
relationship between sensitivity to sexual and pathogen disgust, further research need be 
done to test these hypotheses.
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Chapter 9
General Discussion
The three studies presented in this manuscript provide new information on the 
measurement and construct validity of the TDDS. The first study showed that, of Five 
Factor Model dimensions, sensitivity to pathogen disgust is negatively related to 
openness, sensitivity to sexual disgust is negatively related to openness and positively 
related to agreeableness, and sensitivity to moral disgust is positively related to 
agreeableness and conscientiousness. The second study showed that only sensitivity to 
sexual disgust is uniquely related to political ideology, but that disgust expressed toward 
individuals and ideas of a conflicting ideology – “moral” disgust that is perhaps more 
common than the generic violations included on the moral factor of the TDDS – relates to 
sensitivity to moral disgust. The third study suggested that the TDDS has good internal 
reliability and a good factor structure in a large sample of individuals varying in age and 
geographic location. With a few exceptions – exceptions that may inform future scale 
modifications and tests of the nature of disgust toward pathogens, sex, and immorality –
the measure operated identically for men and women.
The TDDS was developed by Tybur et al. (2009) with two primary goals in mind: 
1) to demonstrate that disgust sensitivity can be divided between pathogen disgust, sexual 
disgust, and moral disgust, and 2) to demonstrate that disgust sensitivity as measured 
with the Disgust Scale (Haidt et al., 1994) is best interpreted as sensitivity to pathogen 
disgust, which can be measured succinctly with a seven-item scale rather than the 32-item 
DS. However, given that the TDDS is a novel, recently published measure, relatively 
little is known of its validity. The three studies included in this manuscript were intended 
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to help fill this gap. The current state of knowledge regarding the three factors on the 
TDDS is detailed below, as are interpretations of this knowledge and directions of future 
research within each domain.
Sensitivity to Pathogen Disgust
Sensitivity to pathogen disgust is highly correlated with overall DS scores and 
with all individual domain scores on the DS-R. Thus, most of the past research conducted 
on “disgust sensitivity” has largely addressed pathogen disgust. This body of literature 
has suggested that sensitivity to pathogen disgust is a risk factor for a variety of 
psychopathologies, including obsessive-compulsive disorder, eating disorders, and blood-
injury-injection disorders. Interpreting such findings in light of the disease-avoidance 
function of pathogen disgust – rather than the symbolic “animal reminder” function 
suggested by Rozin et al. (2008) – may improve understanding of the risk factors, 
motivations, and maintenances of such disorders.
In addition to the theoretical function of pathogen disgust discussed in the 
introduction of this manuscript, individuals who are more sensitive to pathogen disgust 
are less open to new ideas and experiences, which may involve disease risks (Schaller & 
Murray, 2008), and perceive themselves as more vulnerable to disease. These converging 
lines of evidence suggest that variation in sensitivity to pathogen disgust may indeed tap 
individual differences in motivation to avoid disease risks. In this light, sensitivity to 
pathogen disgust may even be a superior measure of disease-avoidance concerns relative 
to Perceived Vulnerability to Disease (PVD; Faulkner et al., 2004), given actual disgust 
experience may be a more accurate manifestation of disease-avoidance than compulsions 
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related to avoiding sick people or public telephones, or objective reports of illness 
frequency (items from the PVD scale).
Sex differences in sensitivity to pathogen disgust are small but reliable. The sex 
difference found in the large sample in Study 3 (d = .20) is similar to those found by 
Tybur et al. (2009) in the development of the TDDS, and echo sex differences in the DS 
and in disgust responses to images of insects, soiled diapers, and goop (Curtis et al., 
2004). Such sex differences may mirror men’s generally more risky life-history strategy, 
or they may reflect women’s suppressed immune function as a necessity of pregnancy. 
These findings set a foundation for understanding individual differences in 
sensitivity to pathogen disgust. However, a very important issue remains unresolved: 
what causes such variation? Even if it can be assumed that sensitivity to pathogen disgust 
reflects motivation to avoid infectious disease, it is unclear why some individuals are 
more motivated than others. Future studies should investigate the development of 
sensitivity to pathogen disgust. It would be valuable to establish if individuals with 
weaker immune systems are more disgusted by pathogen cues, and if there is a period in 
development in which sensitivity to pathogen disgust calibrates to immune function. 
Instead of (or in addition to) actual immune function, sensitivity to pathogen disgust may 
vary as a function of exposure to cues for the presence and consequences of infectious 
disease. For example, seeing conspecifics who appear infected, or being exposed to 
highly ritualized cleaning behaviors, may lead a person to develop a low threshold to 
experience disgust when pathogen cues are detected.   
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Sensitivity to Sexual Disgust
The original DS included four items purported to measure sensitivity to sexual 
disgust: I think homosexual activities are immoral; I think it is immoral for people to seek 
sexual pleasure from animals; You hear about an adult woman who has sex with her 
father; and You hear about a 30 year old man who seeks sexual relationships with 80 year 
old women. These items were dropped from the DS-R because they covaried weakly with 
the other DS items (this is consistent with findings by Tybur et al. (2009) that sensitivity 
to sexual disgust is relatively independent from sensitivity to pathogen disgust). Beyond 
this four-item DS subscale, which perhaps did not relate strongly to sexual disgust, few 
have investigated disgust toward sex, and none have investigated individual differences 
in sensitivity to sexual disgust. 
Although the purported animal-reminder theory of sexual disgust is theoretically 
untenable and is not supported empirically (Tybur et al., 2009), the hypothesis that sexual 
disgust functions to motivate avoidance of potentially costly sexual behaviors is 
consistent with the large sex difference found across studies. The results listed in this 
manuscript – that sensitivity to sexual disgust is negatively related to openness, positively 
related to agreeableness, and positively related to political conservativism – opens the 
door for further theoretical developments regarding the nature of sexual disgust and 
variation in the tendency to be disgusted by sex. 
An interesting – and unexplored – aspect of sensitivity to sexual disgust relates to 
the strong covariation between disgust responses to diverse sexual concepts. For 
example, disgust toward performing oral sex, which seems to involve no direct 
reproductive risks, taps the same latent sexual disgust variable as short-term sex and 
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sexual coercion, which presumably are disgusting largely because of their reproductive 
risks (e.g., not securing investment, not thoroughly evaluating the partner for quality and 
compatibility). This suggests that variation in disgust toward sex operates rather 
generally, further suggesting one of two possibilities. First, it is possible that the different 
costs of sexual behavior covary, thus leading to covarying disgust responses to behaviors 
connoting different costs. Second, it is possible that, regardless of the different costs 
imposed by different sexual behaviors, people tend to act rather globally – they act 
similarly to pathogen-risky sexual behaviors as they do to pregnancy risky sexual 
behaviors. Relatedly, some evidence from Study 3 suggests that one (or both) of these 
two possibilities applies more strongly for men than for women. Given the more varied 
costs of sexual behavior for women, it is possible that sexual disgust operates less 
globally for them relative to men. 
Future research should address both the development and function of varying 
degrees of sensitivity to sexual disgust, and its practical implications. Whereas a large 
body of research has investigated relationships between sensitivity to pathogen disgust 
and psychopathologies, a bevy of disorders may relate to over or under-active sexual 
regulation. Contingent on the stability of sensitivity to sexual disgust across the lifespan, 
low sensitivity may be a risk factor for sexual addiction or risky sexual behavior in the 
future (and may interplay with perceived vulnerability to disease – and sensitivity to 
pathogen disgust – Bryan, 1997), and high sensitivity may be a risk factor for a 
hypoactive sex drive or even conditions such as vaginismus (Miller, 2005). On a practical 
basis, individuals who are more sensitive to sexual disgust may avoid becoming familiar 
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with and practicing safe sex, thus, ironically, leading to greater costs of sexual behavior 
when they do have sex.
Sensitivity to Moral Disgust
Research on moral disgust has advanced significantly in just the past four years. 
Imaging studies (e.g., Shaich Borg et al., 2008) have demonstrated that moral 
transgressions related to violence and theft activate similar neural regions as pathogen 
cues, foul odors have been shown to increase moral judgment (Schall et al., 2008), facial 
expressions in response to moral disgust elicitors have been shown to be similar to those 
activated by pathogen cues (Chapman et al., 2009), and the disgust response to moral 
transgressions has been shown to be present in children at age six (Danovitch & Bloom, 
2009). The introduction of a measure of sensitivity to moral disgust – and the 
demonstration that sensitivity to moral disgust is relatively independent from sensitivity 
to pathogen and sexual disgust – provides another advancement in this area.
Although some have suggested that “moral” disgust is simply a metaphor used by 
lay people for rhetorical effect (Bloom, 2004; Nabi, 2002), results presented here and by 
Tybur et al. (2009) – along with those discussed above – suggest that this is probably not 
the case. Not only are the physiological responses to disgust elicitors like those used in 
the TDDS similar to responses to pathogen cues, but the self-reports of disgust responses 
are internally consistent and demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity in line 
with predictions made from a functional account of moral disgust.
In addition to a bevy of research that might capitalize on investigating individual 
differences in moral disgust (e.g., research on altruism, reciprocity, and third-party 
punishment), this developing literature presents a number of challenges to some popular 
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existing perspectives on moral disgust. According to the CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin et 
al., 1999), disgust is, along with anger and contempt, one of three emotions governing 
moral sanctioning. Under this model, violations of “divinity” (e.g., a person eating a 
piece of rotten meat; a person touching a corpse) elicit disgust, whereas violations of 
“autonomy” (e.g., a person cutting in line) elicit anger and violations of “community” 
(e.g., a 16 year old refusing to give up their seat to an elderly person) elicit contempt. 
These examples of “divinity” elicitors are clearly related to pathogens, and the moral 
violations that seem clearly related to disgust based on results from Shaich Borg et al. 
(2008), Chapman et al. (2009), and Danovitch and Bloom (2009) are categorized as anger 
and contempt elicitors related to community and autonomy.
The connection between specific emotions and moral violations is complicated, 
and it may be the case that specific violations (e.g., stealing) do not statically elicit 
specific emotions (e.g., anger versus disgust). Rather, stealing may elicit anger in some 
situations (e.g., someone stealing your wallet, or someone stealing from your tip jar) 
versus disgust in other situations (e.g., someone stealing someone else’s wallet, or 
someone stealing from someone else’s tip jar). A fruitful research program may 
investigate the marginal costs and benefits associated with anger and aggression versus 
disgust and social avoidance – when marginal costs associated with anger and direct 
confrontation are high, a violation may elicit disgust; when marginal costs associated 
with anger and direct confrontation are low, a violation may elicit anger. 
As with sensitivity to pathogen and sexual disgust, future research on sensitivity 
to moral disgust should investigate the source of individual differences. From these 
studies, we know that sensitivity to moral disgust covaries with an individual’s 
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friendliness and prosociality, and with an individual’s conscientiousness. However, 
sensitivity to moral disgust appears to be relatively independent of political ideology. It 
would be useful to further examine relations between sensitivity to moral disgust and 
individuals’ investment in groups, and investment in social norms that help maintain 
groups. Further, it would be useful to investigate how and why individuals vary in their 
investment in groups.  
As is the case with sensitivity to sexual disgust, sensitivity to moral disgust as an 
individual differences construct could prove useful in a variety of research areas. Disgust 
toward anti-social behaviors may be an important factor in decisions in economic games, 
attitudes toward punishment of norm and law-violators, and perhaps even willingness to 
give benefits to other prosocial individuals. 
Summary
Research related to disgust has many applications, partially because of the 
multiple functions inherent to the emotion. This, in combination with some intrinsic 
interest in disgust, has led to an explosion of disgust research in the past decade. 
However, most of this research has been conducted using either no theoretical framework 
or a theoretical framework seriously lacking in plausibility and empirical support. 
Further, most empirical work concerning individual differences has been done using a 
measure with poor reliability and validity. 
Misguided theory and measurement has survived partially because few studies 
rigorously investigated the reliability and validity of the Disgust Scale introduced by 
Haidt et al. (1994), and still fewer studies interpreted the measure’s validity in terms of a 
theoretically grounded perspective. Research from an alternative, evolutionarily informed 
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perspective can greatly increase the relevance and accuracy of this booming research 
area. For this to happen, though, thorough investigations of measures such as the TDDS 
must first be made. Hopefully, this series of studies progresses the understanding of 
disgust sensitivity, and provides future researchers with information regarding the 
reliability and validity of the TDDS.
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APPENDIX A: THREE DOMAIN DISGUST SCALE
The following items describe a variety of concepts.  Please rate how disgusting you find the 
concepts described in the items, where 0 means that you do not find the concept disgusting at 
all, and 6 means that you find the concept extremely disgusting.
not at all extremely 
disgusting disgusting                          
1.   Shoplifting a candy bar from a convenience store       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
2.   Hearing two strangers having sex            0        1        2        3        4        5        6
3.   Stepping on dog poop            0        1        2        3        4        5        6
4.   Stealing from a neighbor       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
5.   Performing oral sex       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
6.   Sitting next to someone who has red sores on their arm  0        1        2        3        4        5        6
7.   A student cheating to get good grades       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
8.   Watching a pornographic video       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
9.   Shaking hands with a stranger who has sweaty palms     0        1        2        3        4        5        6
10.  Deceiving a friend           0        1        2        3        4        5        6
11.  Finding out that someone you don’t like has           0        1        2        3        4        5        6 
       sexual fantasies about you 
12.  Seeing some mold on old leftovers in your refrigerator    0        1        2        3        4        5        6
13.  Forging someone’s signature on a legal document       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
14.  Bringing someone you just met back to your       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
       room to have sex
15.  Standing close to a person who has body odor       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
16.  Cutting to the front of a line to purchase the       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
       last few tickets to a show
17.  A stranger of the opposite sex intentionally       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
       rubbing your thigh in an elevator
18.  Seeing a cockroach run across the floor       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
19.  Intentionally lying during a business transaction       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
20.  Having anal sex with someone of the opposite sex       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
21.  Accidentally touching a person’s bloody cut       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
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APPENDIX B: NEO-PI-3 
Here are a number of statements that assess personality traits. Please write a number next to each 
statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement.
    1                          2                            3                          4                          5
Disagree      Disagree       Neither agree       Agree   Agree
strongly              a little         nor disagree       a little strongly
_____1. I am not a worrier
_____2. I often get angry at the way people treat me
_____3. I rarely feel lonely or blue
_____4. When I’m around people, I worry that I’ll make a fool of myself  
_____5. It doesn’t bother me too much if I can’t get what I want 
_____6. I often feel helpless and want someone else to solve my problems 
_____7. I really like most people I meet 
_____8. I shy away from crowds of people 
_____9. I am dominant, forceful, and assertive 
_____10. I have a laid-back style in work and play 
_____11. I often crave excitement
_____12. I have never literally jumped for joy
_____13. I have a very active imagination
_____14. I’m not really interested in the arts 
_____15. Without strong emotions, life would be uninteresting to me 
_____16. I’m pretty set in my ways 
_____17. I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas 
_____18. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead them 
_____19. Often, people aren’t as nice as they seem to be  
_____20. I’m not crafty or sly 
_____21. Some people think I’m selfish and egotistical 
_____22. I would rather cooperate with others than compete with them
_____23. I don’t mind bragging about my talents and accomplishments 
_____24. When making laws and social policies we need to think about who might be hurt  
_____25. I’m known for my common sense  
_____26. I don’t mind a little clutter in my room  
_____27. I try to perform all the tasks assigned to me conscientiously 
_____28. I’m not very ambitious 
_____29. I’m pretty good about pacing myself so as to get things done on time 
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_____30. Over the years I’ve done some pretty stupid things 
_____37 I don’t get much pleasure from chatting with people 
_____38. I like to have a lot of people around me 
_____39. Sometimes I don’t stand up for my rights like I should 
_____40. I act forcefully and energetically  
_____41. I wouldn’t enjoy vacationing in Las Vegas
_____42. I have felt overpowering joy 
_____43. I try to keep all my thoughts directed along realistic lines and avoid flights of fancy
_____44. I am sometimes completely absorbed in music I am listening to
_____45. I rarely experience strong emotions 
_____46. I think it’s interesting to learn and develop new hobbies 
_____47. I find philosophical arguments boring 
_____48. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a changing world 
_____49. I believe that most people are basically well-intentioned 
_____50. If necessary, I am willing to manipulate people to get what I want 
_____51. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet 
_____52. I can be sarcastic and cutting when I need to be
_____53. I’d rather not talk about myself and my achievements 
_____54. I don’t worry much about the homeless  
_____55. I sometimes act thoughtlessly  
_____56. I keep my belongings neat and clean 
_____57. Sometimes I’m not as dependable or reliable as I should be 
_____58  I have a clear set of goals and work toward them in an orderly fashion
_____59. I waste a lot of time before settling down to work 
_____60. I think things through before coming to a decision
_____61. I rarely feel fearful or anxious
_____62. I am known as hot-blooded and quick-tempered
_____63. I am seldom sad or depressed
_____64. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide
_____65. I’m always in control of myself 
_____66. When I’m under a great deal of stress, sometimes I feel like I’m going to pieces
_____67. I’m known as a warm and friendly person
_____68. I usually prefer to do things alone
_____69. I have often been a leader of groups I have belonged to
_____70. My work is likely to be slow but steady
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_____71. I have sometimes done things just for “kicks” or “thrills”
_____72. I am not a cheerful optimist
_____73. I have an active fantasy life
_____74. Watching ballet or modern dance bores me
_____75. How I feel about things is important to me
_____76. I like the old-fashioned methods I’m used to 
_____77. I enjoy solving problems or puzzles
_____78. I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues
_____79. I believe that most people will take advantage of you if you let them
_____80. I couldn’t deceive anyone even if I wanted to 
_____81. Some people think of me as cold and calculating
_____82. I hesitate to express my anger even when it’s justified
_____83. I’m better than most people, and I know it
_____84. We can never do too much for the poor and elderly
_____85. I keep myself informed and usually make intelligent decisions
_____86. I’m not a very orderly or methodical person 
_____87. I pay my debts promptly and in full
_____88. When I start a self-improvement program, I usually let it slide after a few days
_____89. I am a productive person who always gets the job done
_____90. Occasionally I act first and think later
_____91. I often feel tense and jittery
_____92. I am not considered a touchy or temperamental person
_____93. I have sometimes experienced a deep sense of guilt or sinfulness
_____94. It doesn’t embarrass me too much if people ridicule and tease me
_____95 When I am having my favorite foods, I tend to eat to much
_____96. I keep a cool head in emergencies
_____97. Many people think of me as somewhat cold and distant
_____98. I really feel the need for other people if I am by myself for long
_____99. In meetings, I usually let others do the talking
_____100. I often feel as if I’m bursting with energy
_____101. I tend to avoid movies that are shocking or scary
_____102. Sometimes I bubble with happiness
_____103. I don’t like to waste my time daydreaming
_____104. I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature
_____105. I seldom pay much attention to my feelings of the moment
_____106. I often try new and foreign foods
97
_____107. I sometimes lose interest when people talk about very abstract, theoretical matters
_____108. Our ideas of right and wrong may not be right for everyone in the world 
_____109. I think most of the people I deal with are honest and trust worthy
_____110. Being perfectly honest is a bad way to do business
_____111. I generally try to be thoughtful and considerate
_____112. If I don’t like people, I let them know it
_____113. I am not a show-off  
_____114. I have no sympathy for beggars 
_____115. I often come into situations without being fully prepared
_____116. I like to keep everything in its place so I know just where it is
_____117. Sometimes I cheat when I play solitaire
_____118. I ignore a lot of silly little rules 
_____119. I have trouble making myself do what I should 
_____120. I always consider the consequences before I take action
_____121. I seldom feel nervous 
_____122. I often get disgusted with people I have to deal with
_____123. I tend to blame myself when anything goes wrong
_____124. I often feel that I am not as good as others   
_____125. I seldom give in to my impulses
_____126. It’s often hard for me to make up my mind
_____127. I really enjoy talking to people
_____128. I prefer jobs that let me work alone without being bothered by people
_____129. Other people often look to me to make decisions
_____130. I’m not as quick and lively as other people
_____131. I like to be where the action is
_____132. I’m not happy-go-lucky 
_____133. I enjoy concentrating on a fantasy or daydream and exploring all its possibilities, letting it grow 
and develop
_____134. Poetry has little or no effect on me
_____135. I experience a wide range of emotions or feelings
_____136. I prefer to spend my time in familiar surroundings
_____137. I enjoy working on “mind-twister”-type puzzles
_____138. I believe that it’s better to stick to your own principles than to be open-minded 
_____139. I’m suspicious when someone does something nice for me
_____140. I would hate to be though of as a hypocrite
_____141. I’m not known for my generosity
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_____142. When I’ve been insulted, I just try to forgive and forget
_____143. I have a very high opinion of myself
_____144. Human need is more important than economics 
_____145. I have good judgment 
_____146. I never seem to be able to get organized
_____147. When I make a commitment, I can always be counted on to follow through
_____148. I don’t feel like I’m driven get ahead
_____149. Once I start a project, I almost always finish it
_____150. I often do things on the spur of the moment
_____151. I often worry about things that might go wrong 
_____152. It takes a lot to get me mad
_____153. I have a low opinion of myself
_____154. I feel comfortable in the presence of my bosses or other authorities
_____155. I sometimes eat myself sick
_____156. I can handle myself pretty well in a crisis 
_____157. I find it easy to smile and be outgoing with strangers
_____158. I’d rather vacation at a popular beach than an isolated cabin in the woods
_____159. I would rather go my own way than be a leader of others
_____160. I usually seem to be in a hurry
_____161. I love the excitement of roller coasters 
_____162. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person
_____163. If I feel my mind starting to drift off into daydreams, I usually get busy and start concentrating 
on some work or activity instead
_____164. Certain kinds of music have an endless fascination for me
_____165. I seldom notice the moods or feelings that different environments produce
_____166. I believe variety is the spice of life 
_____167. I have little interest in speculating on the nature of the universe or the human condition
_____168. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people’s lifestyles
_____169. My first reaction is to trust people
_____170. Sometimes I trick people into doing what I want
_____171. Most people I know like me
_____172. If someone starts a fight, I’m ready to fight back
_____173. I feel that I am no better than others, no matter what their condition
_____174. I believe all human beings are worthy of respect
_____175. I don’t seem to be completely successful at anything
_____176. I’m picky about how jobs should be done  
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_____177. I follow my ethical principles strictly  
_____178. I strive to achieve all I can
_____179. When a project gets too difficult, I’m inclined to start a new one
_____180. I rarely make hasty decisions
_____181. I have fewer fears than most people
_____182. At times I have felt bitter and resentful
_____183. Sometimes things look pretty bleak and hopeless to me 
_____184. If I have said or done the wrong thing to someone, I can hardly bear to face them again
_____185. Sometimes I do things on impulse that I later regret
_____186. When everything seems to be going wrong, I can still make good decisions
_____187. I have strong emotional attachments to my friends
_____188. Social gatherings are usually boring to me
_____189. In conversations, I tend to do most of the talking
_____190. My life is fast paced
_____191. I like loud music 
_____192. I rarely use words like “fantastic!” or “sensational!” to describe my experiences
_____193. As a child I rarely enjoyed games of make believe
_____194. Sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at a work of art, I feel a chill or wave of 
excitement
_____195. I find it easy to empathize—to feel myself what others are feeling
_____196. On a vacation, I prefer going back to a tried and true spot 
_____197. I have a lot of intellectual curiosity
_____198. I think that if people don’t know what they believe in by the time they’re 25, there’s something 
wrong with them
_____199. I tend to assume the best about people
_____200. At times I bully or flatter people into doing what I want them to
_____201. I think of myself as a charitable person
_____202. I’m hard-headed and stubborn
_____203. I would rather praise others than be praised myself
_____204. I have sympathy for others less fortunate than me
_____205. I have many skills 
_____206. I’m not compulsive about cleaning
_____207. I try to do jobs carefully, so they won’t have to be done again
_____208. I strive for excellence in everything I do
_____209. There are so many little jobs that need to be done that I sometimes just ignore them all
_____210. I plan ahead carefully when I go on a trip
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_____211. Frightening thoughts sometimes come into my head
_____212. Even minor annoyances can be frustrating to me
_____213. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up
_____214. I feel awkward around people 
_____215. I am always able to keep my feelings under control
_____216. I’m pretty stable emotionally
_____217. I take a personal interest in the people I work with
_____218. I enjoy parties with lots of people
_____219. I don’t find it easy to take charge of a situation
_____220. I am a very active person
_____221. I like being part of the crowd at sporting events
_____222. I laugh easily
_____223. I would have difficulty letting my mind wander without control or guidance
_____224. I enjoy reading poetry that emphasizes feelings and images more than story lines
_____225. Odd things—like certain scents or the names of distant places—can evoke strong moods in me 
_____226. I follow the same route when I go someplace
_____227. I have a wide range of intellectual interests
_____228. People should honor traditional values, not question them 
_____229. I have a good deal of faith in human nature
_____230. I’m pretty slick when it comes to dealing with people 
_____231. I go out of my way to help others if I can
_____232. I sometimes get into arguments 
_____233. I’m a superior person
_____234. I would rather be known as “merciful” than as “just”
_____235. I am efficient and effective at my work
_____236. I spend a lot of time looking for things I’ve misplaced
_____237. I try to go to work or school even when I’m not feeling well 
_____238. I’m something of a “workaholic”
_____239. I have a lot of self-discipline
_____240. I think twice before I answer a question
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APPENDIX C: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ITEMS
          strongly            strongly
          disagree                         agree
1.   I consider myself to be politically liberal       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
2.   I would say that I am against the death penalty           0        1        2        3        4        5        6
3.   I think that prayer should be allowed in schools           0        1        2        3        4        5        6
4.   I think that homosexuals should have the same       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
      marriage rights as heterosexuals
5.   I often identify with the policies of the Democratic party   0        1        2        3        4        5        6
6.   I believe that illegal immigration is one of the biggest       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
      problems facing our country
7.   I think that possession of marijuana should be legal         0        1        2        3        4        5        6
      in the U.S.
8.   I think that the minimum wage should be raised       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
      considerably
9.   I think that people have a moral responsibility to act in     0        1        2        3        4        5        6
      environmentally friendly ways 
10.  I consider myself to be politically conservative         0        1        2        3        4        5        6
11.  I think it’s important that the government maintain the     0        1        2        3        4        5        6 
       separation of church and state 
12.  I think our gun control laws are too strict       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
13.  I often identify with the policies of the Republican       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
       Party  
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APPENDIX D: POLITICAL DISGUST ITEMS
not at all                              extremely 
disgusting                disgusting
1.   Democrats’ values       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
2.   The 2003 invasion of Iraq            0        1        2        3        4        5        6
3.   Abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy            0        1        2        3        4        5        6
4.   Tax cuts for the wealthy       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
5.   Teaching intelligent design in high school classrooms      0        1        2        3        4        5        6
6.   Gay marriage       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
7.   Current U.S. President George W. Bush       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
8.   Burning the American Flag       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
9.   Former U.S. President Bill Clinton       0        1        2        3        4        5        6
10.  Republicans’ values           0        1        2        3        4        5        6
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